U.S. Department of Justice
Office of Justice Programs
810 Seventh Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20531
Janet Reno
Attorney General
U.S. Department of Justice
Daniel Marcus
Acting Associate Attorney General
Mary Lou Leary
Acting Assistant Attorney General
Noel Brennan
Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Alexa Verveer
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
C.H. AAButch@@ Straub, II
Director, Office for State and Local Domestic Preparedness Support
Andy Mitchell
Deputy Director, Office for State and Local Domestic Preparedness Support
Department of Justice Response Center:
1-800-421-6770
Office of Justice Programs
World Wide Web Homepage:
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov
NCJ181200
Foreword
The Office of the Assistant Attorney General, Office of Justice Programs (OJP) is providing funds to
States under the State Domestic Preparedness Equipment Program for the purchase of specialized
equipment for fire, emergency medical, hazardous materials response services, and law enforcement
agencies. These funds will be used to enhance the capabilities of State and local units of government
to respond to acts of terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
As the State agency designated to administer this program, your role in strategic planning and in
assessing overall State and local capabilities is a critical component of OJP's State and local
domestic preparedness initiative. Receipt of additional funds under the program will be contingent on
the State's development of two separate, but related, documents. The first is a Statewide Needs
Assessment, and the second is a Three-Year Statewide Domestic Preparedness Strategy. The Needs
Assessment will require each State to assess its requirements for equipment, first responder training,
and other resources involved in a WMD response. This Needs Assessment will form the basis of the
Statewide Strategy. The Strategy will direct how States will target grant funds received under the
OJP equipment program and provide OJP a guide on how to target first responder training and other
resources available through OJP's Office for State and Local Domestic Preparedness Support. It is
important to understand that the Strategy is a multi-year document and will continue to guide
deployment of these resources, by the States for equipment funds, and OJP for other resources, over
the next three years.
To assist States in conducting their threat, risk and needs assessments, and developing their three-
year strategy, OJP has developed an on-line data collection tool. This on-line tool was developed in
close cooperation with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC). To guide users of the on-line tool, OJP is providing this Assessment and
Strategy Development Tool Kit. The intent of the Took Kit is to provide users with a step-by-step
guide to which they can refer when the on-line tool becomes available.
States may begin registering users for the on-line data collection tool beginning July 5, 2000, in the
first phase of this process. OJP will implement the second phase of the data collection process on
August 1, 2000. At that time, software will be made available on-line for local jurisdiction data
input. State agencies will be able to input data beginning August 15, 2000, when the third phase of
the on-line process is implemented. Instructions for electronic submission of the data and statewide
strategies using the world wide web can be found on OJP's web page at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/osldps.
I look forward to working with you and your colleagues during the implementation of this program
to enhance State and local emergency response capabilities in preparation for an event that will
hopefully never take place.
Sincerely,
C.H. "Butch" Straub II
Director
Office for State and Local Domestic Preparedness Support
i
OMB#1121-0244
Expires 12/31/00
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Distribution authorized to pre-designated Government agencies (Federal, State, and Local) and their contractors.
Public dissemination is prohibited.
Unauthorized reproduction/distribution may result in civil and/or criminal liability.
This version of the Fiscal Year 1999 State Domestic Preparedness
Equipment Program Assessment and Strategy Development Tool Kit
supercedes all previous versions.
Effective Date: May 15, 2000
Public Reporting Burden
Paperwork Reduction Act Notice. Under the Paperwork Reduction Act, a person is not required to respond to a collection
of information unless it displays a currently valid OMB control number. We try to create forms and instructions that are
accurate, can be easily understood, and which impose the least possible burden for you to provide us with information.
The estimated average time to complete and file your portion of this assessment is four to eight hours. If you have
comments regarding the accuracy of this estimate, or suggestions for making this form simpler, you can write to the Office
for State and Local Domestic Preparedness Support, 810 7th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20531.
ii
ASSESSMENT AND STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT
TOOL KIT
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
Section 1 Assessment and Strategy Development Tool Kit Introduction 1
Section 2 Risk Assessment Process 4
Tab a. Task A: Vulnerability Assessment 5
Appendix: Potential Targets 15
Tab b. Task B: Threat Assessment 16
Tab c. Task C: Public Health Assessment 31
Tab d. Task D: Integration of
Vulnerability/Threat/Public Health 58
Section 3 Capabilities and Needs Assessment 63
Tab a. Sample Operational Capabilities for Emergency
Responders 71
Tab b. OJP Capability TIER Levels 72
Tab c. Tier Level Competency Information 74
Tab d. Compendium of Federally Conducted WMD
Courses 75
Section 4 Jurisdiction Prioritization Matrix 80
Section 5 Three-year Projection Forms 81
Tab a. Three-year Projection - Equipment 82
Tab b. Three-year Projection - Training 85
Tab c. Three-year Projection - Exercises 88
Tab d. Technical Assistance Projections 91
Section 6 Additional Training Information 93
Section 7 Emergency Response Team Survey 94
Section 8 Recommendations for State and Local Response
to WMD Terrorism Incidents 97
Section 9 Statewide Domestic Preparedness Strategy 98
Tab a. Three-Year Statewide Domestic Preparedness
Strategy 99
Tab b. Three-year Statewide Domestic Preparedness
Strategy Matrix 100
Glossary and Acronyms 101
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Section 1
Assessment and Strategy Tool Kit Introduction
A Program Guidelines and Application Kit was provided to each state=s designated
administrative agency for the Fiscal Year (FY) 1999 State Domestic Preparedness Equipment
Program during February 2000. These guidelines and materials included an Appendix C,
AGuidance for Conducting a Needs Assessment and Developing a Statewide Domestic
Preparedness Strategy.@ This guidance specified that the conduct of a Needs Assessment,
followed by the development of a three-year Statewide Domestic Preparedness Strategy were
conditions of the state=s acceptance of grant funds under the FY 1999 State Domestic
Preparedness Equipment Program. Additionally, this guidance indicated that OJP/OSLDPS
developed assessment and strategy tools, detailed guidance and forms to be provided in a
subsequent mailing. Accordingly, this document, Assessment and Strategy Development
Tool Kit for the FY 1999 State Domestic Preparedness Equipment Program is provided for
each of the designated state administrative agencies (SAA) to assist and guide their
assessment conduct and strategy development. This document will be available online and
may be accessed at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/fundopps.htm. Please note that the version mailed to
you is for planning purposes only and that none of the forms therein may be used for
submitting information. All information submitted pursuant to satisfaction of assessment and
strategy requirements must be submitted electronically and forms downloaded from the Web
version of the Assessment and Strategy Development Tool Kit. It was augmented by
OJP/OSLDPS regional workshops held in April, 2000 for the SAAs and by the availability of
extended direct technical assistance.
The tool kit contains eight separate sections following the introduction which combined with
an additional task from Appendix C of the Program Guidelines and Application Kit represent
sequential steps/tasks which each SAA should conduct and complete in order to satisfy the
assessment and strategy conditions of its acceptance of grant funds under the program. A
summary of each of these sections/steps along with a brief commentary on its relationship to
other tasks follows:
Step/Task 1 (Appendix C, Items IIIA and IIIB, Program Guidelines and Application Kit):
Identification and Coordination of Jurisdictions. Prior to conducting the work tasks detailed
in each section of the Assessment and Strategy Tool Kit, each SAA should take actions to
comply with IIIA and IIIB of Appendix C in the Guidelines and Application Kit. Item IIIA
specifies the identification of jurisdictions and item IIIB specifies the particulars of
coordination among program areas, response disciplines, and levels of government. The
SAA is responsible for assuring that its assessment and strategy represent the entire state and
all programs, response disciplines, and levels of government involved in domestic
preparedness within the borders of the state. Only subsequent to initiating and completing the
task of jurisdiction identification and to initiating the task of coordination, should SAAs
begin work on tasks covered in the various sections of the Assessment and Strategy
Development Tool Kit.
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Step/Task 2 (Section 2): Risk Assessment Process includes instruments developed by the
FBI and the CDC to evaluate and integrate vulnerability, threat, and public health
performance and yield a risk profile. This assessment is to be conducted for each identified
jurisdiction within the state. The results of these assessments combined with the results of
the Capabilities and Needs Assessment at Section 3 will allow the SAA to complete the
Jurisdiction Prioritization Matrix at Section 4. Additionally, the results should be directly
and indirectly useful in completing tasks in Sections 3, 5, 7, 8, and especially in completion
of the Statewide Domestic Preparedness Strategy at Section 9.
Step/Task 3 (Section 3): Capabilities and Needs Assessment is designed to provide
operational capability information and guide identification of program needs. This
assessment is to be conducted for each identified jurisdiction within the state. The results of
these assessments combined with results of the Risk Assessment process at Section 2 will
allow the SAA to complete the Jurisdiction Prioritization Matrix at Section 4. The results of
these assessments also should be directly or indirectly useful in completing tasks in Sections
5, 7, 8, and 9. Results are of particular importance for tasks at Sections 5, 8, and 9.
Step/Task 4 (Section 4): Jurisdiction Prioritization Matrix is a form for priority ranking of
each of the state=s identified jurisdictions based on Task 1 (Section 2), Risk Assessment
Process and Task 2 (Section 3), Capabilities and Needs Assessment. One matrix for each
state is to be completed by the SAA. The prioritization should be reflected in tasks related to
completion of the Statewide Domestic Preparedness Strategy at Sections 9.
Step/Task 5 (Section 5): Three-year Projection Forms are designed to report existing
resources/efforts and projected needs for each response discipline within each domestic
preparedness program area. Forms are to be completed for each identified jurisdiction within
the state. Following completion of jurisdiction forms, the SAA is to complete roll up forms
providing a statewide summary of each response discipline=s resources, efforts, and needs
within each domestic preparedness program area. The results of Section 3 work should be
helpful in this effort and the results of Section 5 will be instrumental in completion of tasks at
Sections 8 and 9.
Step/Task 6 (Section 6): Additional Training Information. This form is designed to report
information about domestic preparedness training capacity and needs. Forms are to be
completed for each identified jurisdiction within the state. Information from these forms
should be combined with information on state assets and Arolled-up@ into one statewide
summary form by the SAA. Information from this form should be reflected in the Statewide
Domestic Preparedness Strategy at Section 9.
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Step/Task 7 (Section 7): Emergency Response Team Survey. This form is designed to report the
number and composition of emergency response teams within the state. Forms are to be completed
for each identified jurisdiction within the state. Information from these forms should be combined
with information on state assets and Arolled-up@ into one statewide summary form by the SAA.
Information from this form should be reflected in the Statewide Domestic Preparedness Strategy
covered at Section 9.
Step/Task 8 (Section 8): Recommendations for State and Local Response to WMD Terrorism
Incidents. This form is designed to report recommendations regarding overall domestic preparedness
efforts within the jurisdiction and state. Forms are to be completed for each identified jurisdiction
within the state. Information from these forms should be combined with state-level
recommendations and Arolled-up@ into one statewide summary by the SAA. Information from the
state roll-up should be reflected in the Statewide Domestic Preparedness Strategy covered at Section
9.
Step/Task 9 (Section 9): Statewide Domestic Preparedness Strategy. This section provides an
outline, guidance, and forms to assist completion of the statewide strategy. One statewide strategy
representing all jurisdictions, domestic preparedness programs, and responder disciplines is to be
completed by the SAA based on all work tasks, forms, and guidance covered at Sections 2 through 8.
The conduct of Needs Assessments and the development of Statewide Domestic Preparedness
Strategies represents a thorough nationwide planning process designed to fill critical gaps in this
country=s knowledge about domestic preparedness and to better guide Federal efforts aimed at
building domestic preparedness capacity through development of a sound, fully informed, national
domestic preparedness strategy. The Assessment and Strategy Development Tool Kit combined with
OJP/OSLDPS regional workshops and the availability of extended direct technical assistance should
function to minimize potential difficulties that may be encountered by states in conducting
assessments and developing statewide strategies.
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Section 2
Risk Assessment Process
Overview: The United States government has initiated numerous programs aimed at improving our
domestic preparedness against potential terrorist attacks involving WMD. A fundamental comment
made by numerous government agencies reviewing these programs is that most can improve the
effectiveness of their equipment, training and exercise programs if a needs assessment process is
employed to help prioritize efforts.
The following four tasks of this document are intended to provide a process to conduct assessments
prior to establishment of program priorities aimed at improving jurisdictional domestic preparedness.
Tasks A, B, C and D are designed to provide the jurisdictions with a methodology and the
supporting tools to conduct a comprehensive risk assessment (a combination of threat, vulnerability,
and public health). The risk assessment is designed to provide the necessary evaluation information
to establish priorities for the jurisdiction that will improve response capabilities to WMD terrorism
incidents.
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Section 2, Tab a
Task A: Vulnerability Assessment
For: All local jurisdictions participating in the OJP B FY99 State Domestic Preparedness Equipment
Support Program.
Overview: This vulnerability assessment is needed to benchmark the local jurisdiction=s current
vulnerability profile with regard to a WMD terrorism incident as stated in the Office of Justice
Programs (OJP) FY 1999 State Domestic Preparedness Equipment Program. This assessment is to
be retained by the jurisdiction and is not intended for submission to the state.
Assumptions: There are two key assumptions that should be used as you proceed through the
Jurisdiction Vulnerability Assessment process. They are:
* Use the concept of the Amost likely scenario@ occurring in your jurisdiction when
completing the vulnerability assessments for each vulnerability assessment factor.
The most likely scenario is one that is not the worst case but represents the most
probable kind of WMD event that may occur in your jurisdiction based upon the
unique infrastructure and their attractiveness to any potential terrorist elements or
individuals as a lucrative target to attack.
* An attack against such a target (facility, site, system, or special event) within your
jurisdiction would produce death, injuries, or infrastructure damage that would
overwhelm the jurisdiction=s emergency response capabilities including any mutual
aid agreements/assistance pacts.
Jurisdictional Vulnerability Assessment
The following diagram and four listed steps provide general directions for completion of the
jurisdiction Vulnerability Assessment.
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Vulnerability Process
IDENTIFY Planning Team and
Step I PLANNING TEAM Sub-Groups (If Desired)
IDENTIFY Critical Asset List
Step II POTENTIAL Select Top 10%
TARGETS
CONDUCT Vulnerability
Step III INDIVIDUAL
VULNERABILITY Worksheets
ASSESSMENTS
Step IV DETERMINE
JURISDICTIONAL Highest Rating from
VULNERABILITY Worksheets
Figure 2-1
STEP I - Formation of the Planning Team
Assembling the Planning Team: The first step is to assemble the jurisdiction planning team that
will have a working knowledge of the presence of the following categories of facilities, sites,
systems, and/or special events within your jurisdiction:
Government Services Transportation Centers Electric Power,
Oil/Gas Storage
Water Supply Information/Communications Banking and Finance
Emergency Services Public Health Institutions
Recreational Facilities Commercial/Industrial Miscellaneous
Facilities
It is recommended that the planning team represent law enforcement, fire services, EMS, HazMat,
public works, public health services, and emergency management at the local, state, and Federal
levels that would be affected or respond to an act of terrorism within a jurisdiction.
STEP II BB Compile a list of the Amost important@ facilities, sites, systems, or special event activities
that are present or take place within the jurisdiction.
Develop an all inclusive list of potential targets using the seven general categories of facilities, sites,
systems, and special events. A list of potential targets is located at the appendix (found on page 15)
to this task.
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Using the initial all inclusive list, develop a priority list that will represent only the highest priority or
most critical facilities, sites, systems, or special events located or taking place within your
jurisdiction.
Example: If you have 100 facilities within your jurisdiction select ten (10% of 100) of them to
appear on your priority list of the most important. If you have less than ten potential targets within
your jurisdiction, it is recommended that you assess all of them.
A facility, site, system, or special event selected for the priority list should meet the following
criteria:
A facility, site, system, or venue within the jurisdiction that in the wake of a WMD incident
would result in any or all of the following:
* Large numbers of death and injuries
* Extensive damage or destruction of facilities that provide or sustain human
needs, i.e., power sources, food distribution sites, essential public services, or
* Causes long-term catastrophic consequences to the general local economic
well being of the community.
The planning team is now prepared to conduct an assessment of the vulnerability of these facilities,
sites, systems, and special events to possible WMD terrorism incidents according to the factors
presented in STEP III.
STEP III - Conducting the Individual Target Vulnerability Assessment
The Seven Vulnerability Assessment Factors: The planning team may use the following seven
factors to assess the vulnerability of each individual site listed on your jurisdictional priority list:
Level of Visibility Criticality of Target Value of Target to Potential
Site Threat Element (PTE)
Potential Threat Element Threat of Hazard Potential for Collateral Mass
(PTE) Access to the Target Casualty
Site Population Capacity
The seven factors, their definitions, and associated rating are listed later in this section. Use them as
a reference sheet for completing the Vulnerability Assessment Worksheets.
Complete a Vulnerability Assessment Worksheet for each individual critical target on your priority
list of potential targets according to the following instructions:
Note: Copy the worksheet for each vulnerability assessment performed.
Note: This assessment is based upon the planning team=s overall qualitative judgment of each factor.
It is not a definitive quantitative assessment.
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* Using the Vulnerability Assessment Factors (found starting on page 9), select the rating
value that most closely represents the facility, infrastructure, event, etc., for each of the seven
vulnerability assessment factors.
* Record these ratings in Table 2-a-1 of the Individual Target Vulnerability Assessment
Worksheet for each factor assessed. Be sure to provide the information requested at the top
of the worksheet.
* Total the score for the seven rating factors values at the bottom of Table 2-a-1 at the Total
Score box.
* Compare the Total Score of this potential target with the scale provided in the left column
of the Assessment Key at Table 2-a-2.
* Match the Target Vulnerability Rating listed in the right column of the Assessment Key
that falls within the numeric range of your Total Score.
* Record this Target Vulnerability Rating in the Individual Target Vulnerability Rating
box at Table 2-a-3.
* Repeat the above steps until all facilities, infrastructure, events, etc, (priority target list) you
selected (10% - most important) have been assessed.
* After completing all of your Individual Target Vulnerability Assessments record the
Individual Target Vulnerability Ratings on the Jurisdictional Individual Vulnerability
Summary at Table 2-a-4.
STEP IV BB Determine the Jurisdictional Vulnerability
* Enter the highest Individual Target Vulnerability Rating found in Table 2-a-4 into
Table 2-a-5. This is your Jurisdiction Vulnerability Rating. Also record this
information on Table 2-d-2, Section 2, Tab d, Task D: Risk Assessment.
* Legal WMD (BNICE) Hazard Environment: Enter the total number of sites (as
described below) within the jurisdiction in each classification into Table 2-a-6. Also
record this information on Table 2-d-4, Section 2, Tab d, Task D: Risk Assessment.
1. Biological B Hazardous sites which transfer or receive selected agents listed in 42 CFR
Part 72.
2. Chemical B Hazardous sites which contain Tier II chemicals in either Title 40 or Title 49
CFR.
3. Incendiary/Explosive B Hazardous sites which manufacture, produce, or store in reportable
quantities incendiary and/or explosive materials as delineated in Title 18, USC and 27
CFR 55.
4. Nuclear/Radiological B Hazardous sites which contain radiological sources as described in
10 CFR 36 (Irradiators), 10 CFR 50 (Production and Utilization Facilities), 10 CFR 70
(Special Nuclear Material), DOE critical facilities, and any other nuclear storage sites.
Note: The Individual Target Vulnerability Assessment Worksheet(s) and the Individual Target
Vulnerability Summary are to be retained by the jurisdiction.
Note: The Individual Target Vulnerability Assessment Worksheet is marked AFor Official Use
Only.@ The planning team should limit its distribution only to those government and private sector
officials taking part in this process or who have a professional need to know.
Note: BNICE is an acronym for Biological, Nuclear/Radiological, Incendiary, Chemical, Explosive
agents.
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Vulnerability Assessment Factors
1) Level of Visibility
Level of Visibility Rating Value
Addresses the awareness of the existence and visibility of the target.
Invisible B Classified Location 0
Very Low Visibility B Probably not aware of its existence 1
Low Visibility B Probably not well known existence 2
Medium Visibility B Existence is probably known 3
High Visibility B Existence well known 4
Very High Visibility B Existence is obvious 5
2) Criticality of Target Site to Jurisdiction
Criticality of Target Site Rating Value
Usefulness of assets to population, economy, government, etc. Deemed
critical to the continuity of basic jurisdiction infrastructure.
(Utilities, communications, water, gas, sewage, electrical, petroleum, transportation, medical facility, government
facilities, hampers emergency response)
No Usefulness 0
Minor Usefulness 1
Moderate Usefulness 2
Significant Usefulness 3
Highly Useful 4
Critical 5
3) Value of Target to PTE
Value of Target Rating Value
Evaluates value of the target to serve the ends of the PTEs identified in the
Threat Assessment based on Motivations.
None 0
Very Low 1
Low 2
Medium 3
High 4
Very High 5
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Vulnerability Assessment Factors (Continued)
4) PTE Access to Target
PTE Access to Target Rating Value
Addresses the availability of the target for ingress and egress by a PTE.
Fenced, Guarded, Protected Air/Consumable Entry, Controlled Access by 0
Pass Only, No Vehicle Parking within 50 Feet
Guarded, Protected Air/Consumable Entry, Controlled Access of Visitors and 1
Non-Staff Personnel, No Vehicle Parking within 50 Feet
Protected Air/Consumable Entry, Controlled Access of Visitors and Non-Staff 2
Personnel, No Unauthorized Vehicle Parking within 50 Feet
Controlled Access of Visitors, Unprotected Air/Consumable Entry, No 3
Unauthorized Vehicle Parking within 50 Feet
Open Access to all personnel, Unprotected Air/Consumable Entry, No 4
Unauthorized Vehicle Parking within 50 Feet
Open Access to all personnel, Unprotected Air/Consumable Entry, Vehicle 5
Parking within 50 feet
5) Target Threat of Hazard
Target Threat of Hazard Rating Value
This assesses the presence of WMD Materials (BNICE) in quantities that
would expend internal response capabilities if released.
No WMD materials present 0
WMD materials present in moderate quantities, under positive control, and in 1
secured locations.
WMD materials present in moderate quantities and controlled. 2
Major concentrations of WMD materials that have established control features 3
and are secured in the site.
Major concentrations of WMD materials that have moderate control features. 4
Major concentrations of WMD materials that are accessible to Non-staff 5
personnel.
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Vulnerability Assessment Factors (Continued)
6) Site Population Capacity
Site Population Capacity Rating Value
Maximum number of individuals at a site at any given time.
0 0
1 B 250 1
251 B 500 2
501 - 1000 3
1001 B 5000 4
> 5000 5
7) Potential for Collateral Mass Casualties
Potential for Collateral Mass Casualties Rating Value
Addresses potential collateral mass casualties within a one-mile radius of the
target site. Number ranges indicate inhabitants within a one-mile radius of
the site.
0 to 100 0
101 to 500 1
501 to 1000 2
1001 to 2000 3
2001 to 5000 4
> 5000 5
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For Official Use Only
Individual Target Vulnerability Assessment Worksheet
Individual Target Vulnerability Assessment Values
Factor Score
Visibility
Criticality
Value
Access
Threat of Hazard
Site Population
Collateral Mass Casualties
Total Score
Table 2-a-1
Individual Target Vulnerability Assessment Key
TOTAL SCORE TARGET VULNERABILITY
RATING
0-2 1
3-5 2
6-8 3
9-11 4
12-14 5
15-17 6
18-20 7
21-23 8
24-26 9
27-29 10
30-32 11
33-35 12
Table 2-a-2
Individual Target Vulnerability Rating
Table 2-a-3
Note: Copy this worksheet to use in evaluating each selected individual target.
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For Official Use Only
Individual Target Vulnerability Summary
The following summary form is provided to consolidate the list of potential targets evaluated. The
ranking indicates, from highest to lowest, the Individual Target Vulnerability Ratings from the
Individual Target Assessments conducted.
Ranking Potential Target Name Individual Target
Vulnerability Rating
123456789101112
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
Table 2-a-4
Instructions : The overall AJurisdiction Vulnerability Level@ is the highest Individual Target
Vulnerability Rating assessed. Use the highest rated Potential Target listed on the Individual
Target Vulnerability Summary at Table 2-a-4, record this information below in Table 2-a-5.
__________
Jurisdiction Vulnerability Rating (highest rating recorded on Table
2-a-4)
Table 2-a-5
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Legal WMD (BNICE) Hazard Environment
Hazard Total number of hazardous sites located in jurisdiction
Biological
(Infectious Only)
Chemical
(Tier II)
Incendiary &
Explosive
Nuclear &
Radiological
Total
Table 2-a-6
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Appendix to Section 2, Tab a
Potential Targets
Continuity of Government Services Transportation
Government office buildings/Courthouses Railheads /rail yards Seaports/river ports
Military installations (including reserve components) Interstate highways Bus terminals
Embassies /consulates Tunnels Bridges
Subways Ferries
Airports Truck terminals
Oil pipelines Gas pipelines
Electric Power, Oil/Gas Storage
Electric power production
Electric power distribution
Gas storage and shipment Water Supply
Petroleum storage and shipment Water supply plants
Telecommunications Water purification systems
Water distribution systems
Wastewater plants
Information and Communications
Newspapers
Radio stations Banking and Finance
TV broadcast facilities Banks
Trunking stations for communications / switching / CATV Financial institutions
Emergency Services* Public Health
Law emergency services Hospitals
Fire emergency services Emergency medical centers
State / local Emergency Operations Centers (EOC)
Emergency responder stations
Emergency Medical Services
Recreational Facilities **
Sports arenas / stadiums
Institutions ** Auditoriums
Science research facilities Theaters
Academic institutions Parks
Museums Casinos
Schools Concert halls / pavilions
Restaurants frequented by a target population
Commercial / Industrial Facilities **
Chemical plants
Industrial plants
Petroleum plants Miscellaneous **
Business / corporate centers Special events
Malls / shopping centers Parades
Hotels / convention centers Religious services
Apartment buildings Festivals
Celebrations
Scenic tours
Abortion clinics
Agriculture
Note: Examples are not exhaustive. Local jurisdictional criteria should be added as required.
Categories are from PDD 63 with the following notes. *Combined PDD 63 Categories for Fire and Law.
** Additional categories to those listed in PDD 63.
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Section 2, Tab b
Task B: Threat Assessment
A. Assessment Overview
For: All local jurisdictions participating in the OJP-FY99 State Domestic Preparedness
Equipment Support Program.
Purpose: In June 1995, President Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive-39
(PDD-39) which reaffirmed the FBI=s lead law enforcement and crisis management role in
the U.S. Government=s response to domestic terrorism. In May, 1998, the President signed
PDD-62 which charged the United States Department of Justice (DOJ), acting through the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), as lead agency for Federal operational response to a
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) incident. Pursuant to both of these directives, the FBI
is continuing to increase its involvement with state, local and Federal agencies who have both
a crisis and consequence response role in responding to a WMD threat or incident.
To address domestic terrorism prevention, response, and recovery efforts, it is necessary to
assess the risk, capabilities, and ultimate needs of the state and local response to a terrorist
incident. This assessment process is the first step in ensuring nationwide preparedness. The
DOJ, through the OJP and FBI, has taken the lead in providing this assessment as mandated
by the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1998, and as stated in the OJP
FY 1999 State Domestic Preparedness Equipment Support Program. This WMD Terrorist
Jurisdiction Threat Assessment has been developed as one portion of a larger vulnerability
and risk assessment. The entire process is intended to serve as a benchmark establishing the
local jurisdiction=s current risk profile as it pertains to a domestic WMD terrorism incident.
The comparison of local risk and existing capabilities profiles may be used by the
jurisdictions to identify and prioritize needs.
Objective: The following is a list of objectives of the assessment process.
* Promote interagency collaboration/coordination of criminal investigative intelligence
information relating to WMD terrorism.
* Assess the threat to particular targets, enabling a jurisdiction to better focus its prevention
and preparedness efforts, and also to enhance response capabilities.
* Identify the types of weapons of mass destruction likely to be produced and/or developed
by the existing potential threats to better identify equipment and training needs necessary
to respond to the particular types of hazards.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Distribution authorized to pre-designated Government agencies (Federal, State, and Local) and their contractors.
Public dissemination is prohibited
Unauthorized reproduction/dissemination may result in civil and/or criminal liability.
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Direction: This assessment is to be completed by jurisdictions in coordination with the
designated state agency for the State Domestic Preparedness Equipment Program. Should
the jurisdiction require assistance completing the assessment, it should coordinate with the
designated state agency. It is recommended that the jurisdiction identify other pertinent local,
state, and Federal law enforcement agencies to assist in the assessment process. Once
completed, the local jurisdiction must return the Jurisdiction Threat Profile to the designated
state agency [also known as the State Administrative Agency (SAA). The SAA will then
forward the completed profile to OJP.
B. Introduction
Terrorist events such as the World Trade Center bombing, the bombing of the Alfred P.
Murrah Federal building in Oklahoma City, and the pipe bomb detonated at the Olympic
Games in Atlanta revealed the United States= increased susceptibility to terrorist assaults.
These attacks, coupled with the March 1995 Tokyo subway attack, where the weapon was
the chemical nerve agent sarin, exposed the threat of use of WMD within the United States.
The United States is also experiencing an increased number of hoaxes involving the use of
chemical or biological agents perpetrated by individuals wishing to instill fear and disrupt
communities. While a conventional attack using bombs/explosive devices has been the
weapon of choice domestically, yesterday==s bomb threat may be replaced with a potential
for more exotic biological or chemical threats.
WMD cases, primarily those dealing with the threatened use or procurement of chemical
and biological materials, have steadily increased as depicted in the following chart (*Data
for 1999 through November 30, 1999; Source-FBI WMDOU):
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300
250
200
150 Total
Bio
100
50
0
1996 1997 1998 1999
Figure 2-2
With the threat of domestic WMD terrorist attacks on the rise, there is validity in evaluating
jurisdiction threat data to better identify potential terrorist targets and likely WMD hazards.
This information, coupled with target vulnerability analysis, is the most comprehensive
means by which to evaluate the risk of a WMD terrorist act. The risk to a jurisdiction is then
measured against present capabilities to determine a jurisdiction=s needs.
Although threat information is deemed beneficial to the needs assessment process, it should
not be given undue weight. There remains insufficient empirical data on domestic terrorist
activity to suggest a pattern of particular targeting of a specific region or city. Furthermore,
threat conditions are dynamic, limiting accurate threat analysis to a specific moment in time.
Henceforth, it must be recognized that the identification of a particular threat is not an
absolute predictor that a terrorist incident will occur. Nor should the absence of an identified
threat be construed as meaning that a terrorist incident is less likely to occur.
Nonetheless, the FBI believes that efforts to identify and analyze potential threats at the local
jurisdiction level is essential to the overall assessment process and promotes necessary
interagency collaboration of criminal investigative intelligence information relating to WMD
terrorism. The OJP Integrated Assessment Tool is not intended to take the place of traditional
threat and vulnerability analysis utilized by intelligence and law enforcement communities in
efforts to prevent, deter, and resolve acts of domestic terrorism. Traditional threat and
vulnerability analysis is far more comprehensive. In contrast, the OJP assessment process
provides a simple methodology to assist states in prioritizing program investments. The
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OJP Integrated Assessment Tool provides a general profile of the threat, vulnerability, and
risk environments of a jurisdiction, and is not to be considered an investigative tool for law
enforcement purposes.
C. Definitions
For the purposes of this assessment the following definitions apply:
Domestic Terrorism: The unlawful use, or threatened use, of force or violence by a group or
individual based and operating entirely within the United States or Puerto Rico, without
foreign direction, and whose acts are directed at elements of the U.S. Government or its
population, in the furtherance of political or social goals.
International Terrorism: The unlawful use of force or violence committed by a group or
individual who has some connection to a foreign power or whose activities transcend national
boundaries against persons or property, to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian
population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.
Potential Threat Element (PTE): Any group or individual in which there are allegations or
information indicating a possibility of the unlawful use of force or violence, specifically the
utilization of a Weapon of Mass Destruction, against persons or property to intimidate or
coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of a
specific motivation or goal, possibly political or social in nature. Note: This definition
provides sufficient predicate for the FBI to initiate an investigation.
Weapons of Mass Destruction (Title 18 USC Section 2332a): (1) Any weapon or device
that is intended, or has the capability, to cause death or serious bodily injury to a significant
number of people through the release, dissemination, or impact of toxic or poisonous
chemicals or their precursors; a disease organism; or radiation or radioactivity; (2)(A) Any
explosive, incendiary, or poison gas, bomb, grenade, rocket having a propellant charge of
more than four ounces, or a missile having an explosive or incendiary charge of more than
one quarter ounce, or mine or device similar to the above; (B) poison gas; (C) any weapon
involving a disease organism; or (D) any weapon that is designed to release radiation or
radioactivity at a level dangerous to human life.
D. Assessment Process
The Jurisdiction Threat Assessment is designed to accomplish several goals, all using a
process that encourages open lines of communication between Federal, state, and local
agencies involved in public safety. The assessment utilizes a pre-existing Department of
Defense (DOD) terrorist threat analysis methodology to first identify and evaluate the threat
level of each potential threat element (PTE) identified in your jurisdiction. This
methodology has been revised to meet the requirements of this assessment process.
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The threat level of an existing PTE is determined on the basis of its past violent history;
intentions to commit a WMD act of terrorism; the capability to carry out a WMD act of
terrorism; and any targeting efforts aimed at achieving the specific terrorist act. Each factor
is considered when assessing the potential for violent or destructive activity emanating from
a terrorist group. However, the accuracy of such analysis is dependent on the availability of
intelligence-related information concerning a particular individual or group. Small groups
and rogue individuals, whose activities are difficult to anticipate due to limited or nonexistent
intelligence information, represent an unpredictable but constant threat.
Threat Factors Defined:
Provided for purposes of consistency are the definitions to be applied for each threat factor:
$ Existence: The presence of a group or individual, operating within the jurisdiction in
which there are allegations or information indicating a possibility of the unlawful use
of force or violence, specifically the utilization of a WMD, against persons or
property, to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any
segment thereof, in furtherance of a specific motivation or goal, possibly political or
social in nature.
$ History: Demonstrated past terrorist activity over time or a recorded, violent criminal
history.
$ Intentions: Credible advocacy/threats of force or violence, or acts, or preparations to
act, evidencing the intent to create a WMD, or to carry out a plan to release a WMD,
or to participate in a WMD incident.
$ Capability: Credible information that a specific PTE possesses the requisite training,
skills, financial means, and access to resources necessary to develop, produce, or
acquire a particular type of WMD in a quantity and/or potency sufficient to produce
mass casualties, combined with information substantiating the PTE=s ability to safely
store, test, and deliver the same. All these factors must be met before a group or
individual can be justified as possessing the requisite capability necessary to
implement a WMD attack.
$ Targeting: Credible information indicative of preparations for specific terrorist
operations against identifiable targets within the subject jurisdiction. (Ex. Obtaining
of specific floor plans of a target location or surveillance activities, etc.)
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Calculation of the PTE Threat Level: Each factor is assigned a corresponding numerical
value based on the factor's perceived significance. The threat level is quantified by adding up
the values of all existing threat factors for each PTE. A PTE's threat level may range from a
low of 1 to a high of 10. Below is a list of the threat factors and the corresponding point
value:
THREAT FACTOR VALUES
THREAT FACTOR VALUE
Existence 1
History 1
Intentions 2
Capability 2
Targeting 4
Table 2-b-1
If the information known to the assessment group does not satisfy the parameters set forth in the
definition of any one factor, or the information is not credible, then that factor cannot be
included in the valuation process. Examples are charted below:
EXAMPLE THREAT LEVEL ASSESSMENT
Identity Existence Violent Intentions WMD Targeting PTE
of PTE (1) History (2) Capability (4) THREAT
(1) (2) LEVEL
Example 1 1 1
Example 2 1 2 3
Example 3 1 2 2 4 9
Example 4 1 1 2 4
Example 5 1 1 2 2 4 10
X = FACTORS FOUND TO BE PRESENT
Table 2-b-2
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To achieve the minimum measurable threat level, a jurisdiction must find that a PTE "exists"
within the context of the required definition. This definition of the PTE was designed to
correlate with the FBI==s definitional threshold required to initiate a criminal
investigation. Compared to the large number of jurisdictions covered in this
assessment, the number of current FBI WMD terrorist investigations where PTEs have
been identified is relatively low. Past threat incidents, where resolution resulted in the
cessation of PTE should not be included in this portion of the threat level assessment. The
threat assessment requires the current Aexistence@ of PTEs operating within the assessing
jurisdiction. Past WMD terrorist threat incidents are addressed separately.
The Threat Assessment Working Group should further note that if a threat level of A5@ or
above is achieved for any PTE, the situation may likely require immediate action by law
enforcement agencies and/or the emergency response community. This is because the
capability to produce or develop a WMD and the intent to implement a WMD terrorist act
has been established. The threat increases in significance when the PTE is deemed to possess
the capability and the requisite intent to carry out a WMD attack. If the existence of a WMD
is confirmed or intelligence and circumstances indicate a high probability that a device
exists, the threat has developed into a WMD incident as defined in the Federal Response
Plan. This requires an immediate response to identify, acquire, and plan the use of Federal
assistance to state and local authorities in response to the potential consequences of the
terrorist use or employment of the WMD. Therefore, timely notification and coordination
with the FBI is essential.
PTE Target Evaluation:
Recognizing the motivation(s) of the PTEs will enable the assessment working group to more
accurately assess the relative threats to specific and/or general categories of jurisdiction
targets. For purposes of this assessment, five general motivator categories have been
established, along with types of targets historically associated with each motivator. This list
is provided as a general guide and is in no way is meant to limit the identification of other
targets that the assessment group may deem equally critical:
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Motivator Examples of Likely Targets
Anything perceived as a symbol or integral part
of the governing establishment (government
Political buildings, courthouses, revenue service,
political events, campaigns)
Anything perceived as a symbol of, acting
contrary to, or in support of group or individual
Religious religious beliefs (banks, newspaper companies,
Planned Parenthood facilities, large public
venues, etc.)
Racial Social and legal entities that promote equality
among races
Organizations or facilities that are perceived to
Environmental be damaging to the environment (logging
industry, nuclear power plants, dams, etc.)
Organizations or entities perceived to be acting
Special Interest contrary to the interest of the PTE (animal
rights, anti-technology, etc.)
Table 2-b-3
PTE Weapon Evaluation:
For purposes of this assessment, AWeapons of Mass Destruction@ have been broken down into
five distinct categories, i.e. biological, nuclear/radiological, incendiary, chemical, and
explosive devices. Matching a PTE=s threat level with the PTE=s assessed capability to carry
out a terrorist attack while employing one or more types of WMD is a necessary step in
predicting which WMD(s) will be of most concern to a given jurisdiction.
Historical Data:
Past threat incidents, where resolution resulted in the cessation of PTE operations, or
incidents that were later determined to be hoaxes, are important factors when assessing the
needs of a given jurisdiction. Areas that have experienced a higher than average number of
threat incidents where assets were expended in response to these events should be
recognized. Therefore, this information is collected as part of the jurisdiction=s threat and
risk assessment profiles.
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E. Assessment Instructions
[STEP ONE] Formation of the Threat Assessment Working Group:
The first step is to assemble a Threat Assessment Working Group. The key is to review and
evaluate threat information known to other Federal, state, and local organizations that
possess such information. If your jurisdiction is a member of a FBI Joint Terrorism Task
Force or a Joint Terrorism Working Group, this would be the appropriate venue for the
assessment process, especially in light of the pre-clearance to review sensitive information
and the FBI=s participation in each group. If no Joint Terrorism Task Force or Joint
Terrorism Working Group exists in your jurisdiction, coordinate your efforts with the FBI
WMD coordinator(s) assigned to your jurisdiction. Federal, state and local jurisdictions
need to share and compare information on a continuing basis during and well after the
completion of this assessment.
The FBI WMD coordinators, having been briefed on this process, stand ready to assist and
will review the assessments to ensure that they are consistent with any intelligence known at
the Federal level. However, the FBI WMD coordinators may or may not be in a position to
physically participate in the assessment process at each jurisdiction level. If no FBI
representation is readily available in your jurisdiction, look to a member of your law
enforcement community to gather officials of other law enforcement agencies to participate
in the assessment process. In other areas there are existing criminal intelligence consortiums
that can be used for comparison and validation. There is much valuable, unclassified
information that will benefit the assessment on the Internet, in publications, and in the media.
As this information will be of a sensitive nature, it is suggested that only individuals privy to
such information as a part of their routine responsibilities be allowed to participate. It must
also be recognized that legal and operational constraints associated with the collection and
sharing of certain criminal intelligence information exists. Therefore, it is understood that
situations will occur where ongoing investigations cannot be disclosed. It is further
understood that for purposes of avoiding any legal issues, certain restrictions do apply.
In order to protect the integrity and confidentiality of sensitive intelligence information on
specific groups or individuals, and in order to comply with certain legal principles and
privacy laws circumscribing the collection, maintenance, and dissemination of intelligence
on individuals or groups who may be identified as a PTE, no specific identity of the PTEs
evaluated in the assessment process will be included in the information forwarded to the
designated state agency. Since this process is focused on determining training and equipment
needs and is not intended as an intelligence-gathering tool, such information is not necessary
to the process. However, for audit purposes, a jurisdiction should be prepared to justify its
responses. After this information is submitted to the designated state agency, FBI WMD
coordinators assigned to the state will review the rolled-up data for consistency with existing
information files.
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[STEP TWO] Complete the Jurisdiction Threat Worksheet (PART F):
The Jurisdiction Threat Worksheet (PART F) is to be completed by the assessment working
group. Record all relevant information onto the Jurisdiction Threat Worksheet. The
Jurisdiction Threat Worksheet will be used to complete the Jurisdiction Threat Profile
(PART G). The Jurisdiction Threat Profile is the only portion of the threat assessment to be
forwarded to the designated state agency.
Dissemination of the Jurisdiction Threat Worksheet is restricted in order to protect the
integrity and confidentiality of sensitive intelligence information, and in order to
comply with certain legal principles and privacy laws circumscribing the collection,
maintenance, and dissemination of intelligence on individuals or groups who may be
identified as a potential threat element (PTE), as defined in Part C of this document.
[STEP THREE] Complete the Jurisdiction Threat Profile (PART G):
The Jurisdiction Threat Profile (PART G) will constitute the returnable portion of the
assessment to the designated state agency. Begin the Jurisdiction Threat Profile by
answering the preliminary questionnaire. Thereafter, utilize the information recorded on the
Jurisdiction Threat Worksheet, Table 2-b-4, to complete Tables 2-b-7 through 2-b-8 of the
profile. Once the profile is complete, return it to your assessment coordinator. Retain a
copy for your records.
[STEP FOUR] Complete the Jurisdiction Risk Assessment Profile:
Submit the Threat Assessment Profile (Part G) to the jurisdiction for integration into the Risk
Assessment Profile.
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F. JURISDICTION THREAT WORKSHEET
Task I: Identify no more than 15 PTEs operating in your jurisdiction. It is important to note that the
number of PTEs identified does not affect the jurisdiction=s risk factor. Only the PTE with the highest
threat level is considered in the risk factor equation. Follow the instructions below to complete the
Jurisdiction Threat Worksheet.
A. EVALUATE THE PRESENCE OF EACH THREAT FACTOR: Evaluate each threat
factor (Existence, Capability, Intentions, History, and Targeting) attributable to each PTE
identified in your jurisdiction. For each PTE, identify the threat factor(s) whose presence has
been established, and record the corresponding numerical value in the appropriate threat
factor column to the right of the PTE on the Jurisdiction Threat Worksheet (examples are
provided). The assessment working group should only consider factors where information
concerning the PTE has satisfied the definitional standards of the threat factors previously set
forth in this assessment. If the intelligence information does not meet those standards or the
information is not deemed credible, then the respective threat factor cannot be justified to
exist and must be left blank.
B. CALCULATE THE THREAT LEVEL OF EACH PTE: Add the corresponding point
values of each threat factor whose presence has been established and insert the value in the
AThreat Level@ column for each PTE. The corresponding point values are listed under each
threat factor at the top of the Jurisdiction Threat Worksheet. Threat levels may range from
one to ten.
C. IDENTIFY THE MOTIVATION(S) OF EACH PTE: If one or more motivators are
established for a PTE, list the particular motivator(s) associated with the corresponding PTE
under the AMotivation@ column in the Jurisdiction Threat Worksheet.
D. IDENTIFY THE WMD CAPABILITY OF EACH PTE: For each PTE assessed to
have the capability to produce or develop a WMD, identify the particular type(s) of
WMD. List these WMD types in the far right column of the Jurisdiction Threat
Worksheet. List only capabilities that have been substantiated. The mere threat to
utilize a WMD of a certain type, or an assertion that the capability exists is not
sufficient.
The Jurisdiction Threat Worksheet is not for dissemination outside the assessing jurisdiction.
Identities of the PTEs are for law enforcement purposes only and should not be shared
outside of the Threat Assessment Working Group.
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Threat Motivation WMD
Level Categories
(1-10) P=Political
R=Religious B=Biological
E=Environmental N=Nuclear/
THREAT Ra=Racial Radiological
S=Special Interest I=Incendiary
FACTORS C=Chemical
Choose one or more E=Explosive
U=Unknown
Choose one or more
PTE Existence Violent Intentions WMD Targeting
(1) History (2) Capability (4)
(1) (2)
Ex. S=Anti-Tobacco
ABC 1 2 3 U
Group
Ex.
DEF 1 1 2 4 E C/E/I
Group
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
Table 2-b-4
The Jurisdiction Threat Worksheet is not for dissemination outside the assessing
jurisdiction. Identities of the PTEs are for law enforcement purposes only and
should not be shared outside of the Threat Assessment Working Group.
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Task II: Complete the WMD Threat/Incident History Table
1. List the number of terrorism-related threat incidents, by WMD category, that occurred in your
jurisdiction since January 1, 1998, which resulted in the activation of emergency response assets.
2. List the number of incidents (derived from Aa@) that were subsequently determined to be hoaxes.
Note: The Threat Assessment Working Group should share this information with the planning
group to ensure that this information is correct from both the crisis and consequence
responder perspective. This information should also be included as part of the Jurisdiction
Risk Profile .
Threatened WMD Hazard Total Number of Terrorist Number of Terrorist Threat
Threat Incidents Incidents Determined to be
Hoaxes
Biological
Nuclear/Radiological
Incendiary
Chemical
Explosive
Total #
Table 2-b-5
Use information collected in Tasks I and II above to complete the Jurisdiction Threat Profile,
Paragraph G.
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G. JURISDICTION THREAT
PROFILE
To be forwarded to the designated state agency
1) PRELIMINARY INFORMATION
State: _____________________
Jurisdiction of the Threat Assessment Working Group: ___________________________
Population of Jurisdiction: ________________
Coordinating Agency:
KCity Police KCounty Sheriff/Police KState Police/Patrol
Other ____________________________
Point of Contact (POC) for the Threat Assessment Working Group
Name of POC: __________________________________
Agency of POC: ________________________________
POC Telephone Number : _________________________
POC E-Mail Address:_____________________________
List All Agencies Represented within the Threat Assessment Working Group
_________________________
_________________________
_________________________
_________________________
_________________________
_________________________
What FBI Field Division serves your jurisdiction? _____________________________
Does your jurisdiction participate in a Joint Terrorism Task Force - if so which?
_______________________
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G. JURISDICTION THREAT PROFILE (Cont.)
2) NUMBER OF PTEs ASSESSED
Using information in Table 2-b-4 of the Jurisdiction Threat Worksheet, list the total number of PTEs
assessed in your jurisdiction.
Total Number of PTEs
3) EXISTING CAPABILITIES
Designate the types of WMD capabilities assessed to exist in the jurisdiction (Table 2-b-4):
KNone KIncendiary
KBiological KChemical
KNuclear/Radiological KExplosive
4) WMD THREAT HISTORY
Record the total number information for ANumber of Threat Incidents@ which have occurred in your
jurisdiction since January 1, 1998. (Below table is same as Table 2-b-5.)
WMD Threat/Incident History
(January 1, 1998 to present)
Threatened WMD Hazard Total Number of Number of Terrorist Threat
Terrorist Threat Incidents Incidents Determined to be
Hoaxes
Biological
Nuclear/Radiological
Incendiary
Chemical
Explosive
Total #
Table 2-b-7
5) JURISDICTION THREAT RATING
Utilizing Table 2-b-4, select the highest threat level obtained of all PTEs identified within your
jurisdiction. Record this number in the right hand portion of Table 2-b-8, below. This number
represents your jurisdiction==s highest threat level. This is the Jurisdiction Threat Rating and
will be used in Task D to determine the Jurisdiction Risk Rating, i.e., a combination of threat
and vulnerability.
Jurisdiction Threat Rating
Table 2-b-8
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Section 2, Tab c
Task C: Public Health Performance Assessment
Instrument for Emergency Preparedness
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES Public Health Service
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
Atlanta, GA 30333
Dear Colleague , October 4, 1999
The attached Public Health Assessment Instrument for Public Health Preparedness will assist you
in determining the ability of your State and/or Local Public Health System to rapidly and
effectively respond to biological and chemical agents, as well as other acute public health
emergencies.
This instrument was developed as a collaborative effort of the Bioterrorism Preparedness and
Response Program, National Center for Infectious Diseases, Centers For Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC); the National Public Health Performance Standards Program, Public Health
Practice Program Office, CDC; and the Emergency Preparedness and Response Branch, National
Center For Environmental Health, CDC; with the full collaboration of other CDC Centers,
Institutes and Offices having public health bioterrorism preparedness and response
responsibilities. Our public health constituency partners at the national, state, and local levels
include the National Association of County and City Health Officials (NACCHO), the
Association of State and Territorial Health Officials (ASTHO), and the Council of State and
Territorial Epidemiologists (CSTE). They have all been actively involved in the development of
this tool and implementation plan.
In addition, this instrument is part of a Office of State and Local Domestic Preparedness Support,
Office of Justice Programs, Department of Justice national project to develop an integrated
statewide assessment of emergency response activities. The Department of Justice requested
assistance from CDC to include a public health component for this overall survey instrument.
We believe that this will be is an excellent opportunity for you to determine your public health
system=s capability to respond. We strongly encourage you to complete this assessment in your
local jurisdictions following the regional training sessions (to be held over the next few months
by the Department of Justice and their assessment partners). Your inputs and feedback will be
invaluable. CDC and its public health partners look forward to working with you as we
collaborate to improve our nation=s public health capacity to respond to the threat of bioterrorism
and other public health emergencies.
Sincerely,
Scott R. Lillibridge , M.D. Paul Halverson, Dr.P.H.
Director, Bioterrorism Preparedness and Director, National Public Health Performance
Response Program (Proposed) Deputy Director, Division of Public Health
Office of the Director Systems
National Center for Infectious Diseases Public Health Practice Program Office
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Public Health Performance Assessment - Emergency Preparedness
A. Public Health and the Department of Justice Assessment Process
In order to assess the baseline of readiness to respond to the threat of biological, chemical and
radiological emergencies, CDC, in collaboration with public health partners has developed the
attached public health emergency preparedness assessment instrument. This tool is
integrated with the threat assessment tool developed by the FBI and the risk, capabilities, and
needs assessment instruments developed for the US Department of Justice. These instruments
together form an integrated assessment instrument for state and local jurisdictions.
The public health assessment is organized according to the ten essential services of public health
which were developed in 1994 by representatives of ASTHO, NACCHO, the Institute of
Medicine, the Association of Schools of Public Health, the Public Health Foundation, the
National Association of State Alcohol and Drug Abuse Directors, National Association of State
Mental Health Program Directors, and the U.S. Public Health Service
(http://web.health.gov/phfunctions/public.htm).
The terms local public health system (LPHS) and local public health agency (LPHA) are used
frequently in the assessment.
The local public health system (LPHS) is the collection of public and private organizations
contributing to public health at the local level. In some cases, organizations headquartered
outside the local jurisdiction may be included in the LPHS if these organizations contribute to
public health at the local level. The contribution need not be permanent or ongoing, so long as it
contributes to public health at the local level. Components of the LPHS may include:
* Governmental entities--including local public health agency (LPHA) or department,
board of health, local or regional branch of state health department bearing responsibility for
the delivery of any public health service to the jurisdiction
* Hospitals serving the jurisdiction
* Managed care organizations serving the jurisdiction
* Clinics and physicians serving the jurisdiction
* Social service providers
* Civic organizations providing public health services to the jurisdiction
* Professional organizations providing public health services to the jurisdiction
* Local businesses providing public health services to the jurisdiction
* Neighborhood organizations providing public health services to the jurisdiction
* Faith institutions providing public health services to the jurisdiction
* Transportation providers providing public health services to the jurisdiction
* Educational institutions providing public health services to the jurisdiction
* Public safety and emergency response agencies and organizations
* Environmental or environmental-health agencies
* Non-profit organizations/advocacy groups providing public health services to the
jurisdiction
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The local public health agency (LPHA) may vary in different jurisdictions, but usually includes the local
health department, local board of health, and/or other local governmental entity designed to provide public
health services to the jurisdiction.
In many communities, the LPHA is one of many participants--although a major player--in the LPHS. The
State may provide services, which comprise a part of the local public health system. These concepts should
be discussed by the team that will complete the assessment instrument.
B. Completing the Assessment
1. Defining the jurisdiction - The jurisdiction under assessment may be a city, a county, multiple counties, a
metropolitan area or a region. All are acceptable for assessment purposes. To facilitate analysis, please
provide a list of all geographic areas included in the surveyed jurisdiction.
2. Identifying the team of respondents - A single person or organization will not be able to adequately
complete the assessment. During pilot testing, the instrument was best completed when the head of the
local public health agency assembled a team from the LPHS who represented the range of services
required to respond to public health emergencies. As guidance, we highly recommend that
representatives from: the local public health agencies, hospitals, emergency medical services; fire
department, law enforcement, media and others involved in local emergency planning, be involved in the
completion of the assessment. Page three of the assessment instrument contains a sign-up sheet for those
person participating in the assessment.
3. Answering the questions B We have tried to make all questions answerable with a definite YES or NO.
However, there will be certain questions that respondents may be uncertain how to answer. Respondents
should answer YES to any question that is partially met.
C. Overview of Capabilities of Local Public Health Jurisdiction
The set of questions on page 35 titled `Overview of Capabilities of Local Public Health Jurisdiction' are
a set of consensus indicators frequently used for measuring community-level public health capacity.
Because these indicators have been used in prior assessments of public health performance, completing this
survey in addition to the public health emergency preparedness assessment instrument will contribute to the
science-base of performance measurement in public health practice.
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Performance Assessment Public Health Emergency Preparedness
This should be completed by staff of the local public health agency or agencies being assessed
Assessment Completion
Date:
Name of Health
Agency Coordinating
Completion of Assessment:
Mailing Address:
City: State: Zip Code:
Telephone: FAX: Web site or email address:
Public Health Agency Title:
Director Coordinating
Completion of
Assessment:
Degree(s): Email Address:
Telephone: Pager: Cell Phone:
Emergency Response Title:
Representative
Coordinating Completion
of Assessment:
Degree(s): Email Address:
Telephone: Pager: Cell Phone:
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Person in charge of completing Title:
and submitting this assessment
to the statewide coordinator:
Email Address: Telephone:
Categorize your jurisdiction by selecting one of the following, or describe its structure under "other":
o County o City/Municipal o City/County
o District o Regional o State
o Other (Specify):
For purposes of identifying the coverage area for this assessment, please list the geographic
area(s) included in this assessment e.g. Henry County. Geographic area can include one or
more counties, township, individual city or town. (If more than one county is included, please
list all counties.) If the description of your jurisdiction is NOT a county, city, or multiple
counties, please list ALL zip codes for the geographic area the assessment covers.
What is the most recent population of
the jurisdiction reported in this
assessment? Population Mo./Yr. /
Total number of employees working in the local public health agency
(or agencies) being reported this assessment Number by Category
Full time employees
Contractual
Part time
Other
Total Employees
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Public Health Emergency Preparedness Assessment Team
Please list all persons who contributed to this assessment*
Name Jurisdiction Job Area of Phone E-mail
Represented Expertise Address
1. (Facilitator)
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
*NOTE: Can use hyperlink to a list.
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Forms in this document are not for submission
Overview of Capabilities of Local Public Health Jurisdiction
1. For the jurisdiction served by your local health department, is there a
community needs assessment process that systematically describes the Yes o No o
prevailing health status in the community?
2. In the past three years in your jurisdiction, has the local public health
agency surveyed the population for behavioral risk factors? Yes o No o
3. For the jurisdiction served by your local health agency, are timely
investigations of adverse health events, including communicable disease
outbreaks and environmental health hazards, conducted on an ongoing Yes o No o
basis?
4. Are the necessary laboratory services available to the local public health
agency to support investigations of adverse health events and that meet Yes o No o
routine diagnostic and surveillance needs?
5. For the jurisdiction served by your local public health agency, has an
analysis been completed of the determinants and contributing factors of
priority health needs, adequacy of existing health resources, and the Yes o No o
population groups most impacted?
6. In the past three years in your jurisdiction, has the local public health
agency conducted an analysis of age-specific participation in preventive Yes o No o
and screening services?
7. For the jurisdiction served by your local public health agency, is there a
network of support and communication relationships that includes Yes o No o
health-related organizations, the media, and the general public?
8. In the past year in your jurisdiction, has there been a formal attempt by
the local public health agency at informing elected officials about the Yes o No o
potential public health impact of decisions under their consideration?
9. For the jurisdiction served by your local public health agency, has there
been a prioritization of the community health needs that have been Yes o No o
identified from a community needs assessment?
10. In the past three years in your jurisdiction, has the local public health
agency implemented community health initiatives consistent with Yes o No o
established priorities?
11. For the jurisdiction served by your local public health agency, has a
community health action plan been developed with community Yes o No o
participation to address community health needs?
12. During the past three years in your jurisdiction, has the local public
health agency developed plans to allocate resources in a manner Yes o No o
consistent with community health action plans?
13. For the jurisdiction served by your local public health agency, have
resources been deployed as necessary to address priority health needs Yes o No o
identified in the community health needs assessment?
14. In the past three years in your jurisdiction, has the local public health
agency conducted an organizational self-assessment? Yes o No o
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15. For the jurisdiction served by your local public health agency, are age-
specific priority health needs effectively addressed through the Yes o No o
provision of, or linkage to appropriate services?
16. Within the past year in your jurisdiction, has the local public health
agency provided reports to the media on a regular basis? Yes o No o
17. For the jurisdiction served by your local public health agency, have
there been regular evaluations of the effects of public health services on Yes o No o
community health status?
18. In the past three years in your jurisdiction, has the local public health
agency used professionally recognized processes and outcome measures Yes o No o
to monitor programs and to redirect resources as appropriate?
19. In your jurisdiction, is the public regularly provided with information
about current health status, health care needs, positive health Yes o No o
behaviors, and health care policy issues?
20. In the past three years in your jurisdiction, has there been an instance in
which the local public health agency has failed to implement a
mandated program or service? Yes o No o
Essential Service #1: Monitor health status to identify community health problems
1.1 Indicator: Monitoring for Rapid detection
1.1.1 Does the LPHS monitor community and health indicators which
may signal biological, chemical and/or radiological incidents? Yes o No o DK o
DK = Don't know
Other Not at Don't
If yes, how frequently are the Daily Weekly Monthly Freq all Know
following rates monitored: (D) (W) (M) (O) (No) (DK)
1.1.1.1 Hospital admission D o W o M o O o No o DK o
1.1.1.2 ICU occupancy D o W o M o O o No o DK o
1.1.1.3 Unexplained deaths
(including medical D o W o M o O o No o DK o
examiner/coroner cases)
1.1.1.4 Unusual syndromes in D o W o M o O o No o DK o
ambulatory patients
1.1.1.5 Influenza-like illness D o W o M o O o No o DK o
1.1.1.6 Ambulance runs D o W o M o O o No o DK o
1.1.1.7 911 calls D o W o M o O o No o DK o
1.1.1.8 Poison control centers calls D o W o M o O o No o DK o
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1.1.1.9 Pharmaceutical demand
(antimicrobial agent usage, D o W o M o O o No o DK o
etc.)
1.1.1.10 Emergency department D o W o M o O o No o DK o
utilization
1.1.1.11 Outpatient department
utilization D o W o M o O o No o DK o
1.1.1.12 Absenteeism in large D o W o M o O o No o DK o
worksites
1.1.1.13 Absenteeism in schools D o W o M o O o No o DK o
1.1.1.14 Others (specify)
1.2 Indicator: Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment
1.2.1 Does the LPHS perform, or have access to, hazard
assessments of the facilities within its jurisdiction? Yes o No o DK o
If yes, are hazards at the following facilities assessed:
1.2.1.1 Academic institution and other laboratories Yes o No o DK o NA o
1.2.1.2 Agriculture co-op facilities Yes o No o DK o NA o
1.2.1.3 Chemical manufacturing and storage Yes o No o DK o NA o
1.2.1.4 Dams, levies, and other flood control mechanisms Yes o No o DK o NA o
1.2.1.5 Facilities for storage of infectious waste Yes o No o DK o NA o
1.2.1.6 Firework factories Yes o No o DK o NA o
1.2.1.7 Food production/storage plants Yes o No o DK o NA o
1.2.1.8 Military installations (includes National Guard units
& Reserves) Yes o No o DK o NA o
1.2.1.9 Munitions manufacturers or storage depot Yes o No o DK o NA o
1.2.1.10 Pesticide manufacturing/storage Yes o No o DK o NA o
1.2.1.11 Petrochemical refinery/storage facility Yes o No o DK o NA o
1.2.1.12 Pharmaceutical companies Yes o No o DK o NA o
1.2.1.13 Radiological power plants or radiological fuel
processing facilities Yes o No o DK o NA o
1.2.1.14 Reproductive health clinics Yes o No o DK o NA o
1.2.1.15 Ventilation systems for high occupancy buildings Yes o No o DK o NA o
1.2.1.16 Water treatment and distribution centers Yes o No o DK o NA o
1.2.1.17 Others (Specify) __________________________________
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Essential Service #2: Diagnose and investigate health problems and health hazards in the community
2.1 Indicator: Information System Capacity
Some questions Section 2.1 apply to the Emergency Response Coordinator (ERC) for your
LPHA. This is the person who would lead the local health department's effort in the event of a
bioterrorism incident (e.g. health officer, LHD Director, environmental health director, etc.). The
actual title of this person will vary from locality to locality.
2.1.1 Does the Emergency Response Coordinator (ERC) have a Yes o No o DK o
computer at work (e.g. primary or exclusive use of computer)?
If yes,
2.1.1.1 Does the ERC have a CD-ROM reader? Yes o No o DK o
2.1.1.2 Does the ERC have internet e-mail?
If yes, Yes o No o DK o
2.1.1.2.1 Does the ERC (or someone they authorize) check his/her
e-mail at least once each workday? Yes o No o DK o
2.1.1.2.2 Has the internet email system for this jurisdiction failed for
more than 5 consecutive working hours during the last Yes o No o DK o
month (excluding scheduled downtime)? If yes,
2.1.1.2.2.1 Was the Internet e-mail system repaired within one (1)
working day the last time it failed? Yes o No o DK o
2.1.1.3 Does the ERC have an internet connection of at least 56 kbps
speed to his/her desktop? Yes o No o DK o
2.1.1.4 Does the ERC have CONTINUOUS Internet access at work
(e.g. "always on", not dial-up)? Yes o No o DK o
2.1.1.5 Has the Internet connection for this jurisdiction failed for
more than 5 consecutive hours during the last month Yes o No o DK o
(excluding scheduled downtime)? If yes,
2.1.1.5.1 Was the Internet connection for this jurisdiction repaired
within one (1) working day the time it last failed? Yes o No o DK o
2.1.1.6 Can the ERC browse the World Wide Web? If yes, Yes o No o DK o
2.1.1.6.1 Is this browser Netscape Communicator v4.07 or newer or
Microsoft Internet Explorer v4.04 or newer? Yes o No o DK o
2.1.2 Can your local health jurisdiction receive urgent health alerts from
the state department of health within one (1) working day? Yes o No o DK o
2.1.2.1 Has the state used or tested the health alert system within the
past three months? Yes o No o DK o
2.1.2.2 By what technology (or technologies ) do you receive health
alerts from your state health department?
2.1.2.2.1 Telephone (individual call) Yes o No o DK o
2.1.2.2.2 Auto-dial (computer generated telephone call) Yes o No o DK o
2.1.2.2.3 E-mail Yes o No o DK o
2.1.2.2.4 None Yes o No o DK o
2.1.2.2.5 Other (please specify)
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2.1.3 Does the local jurisdiction have a system for broadcasting health Yes o No o DK o
alerts to targeted community groups? If yes,
2.1.3.1 What technology (or technologies) does the local health
jurisdiction currently use to broadcast health alerts?
2.1.3.1.1 Telephone (Individual call) Yes o No o DK o
2.1.3.1.2 Auto-dial (computer generated telephone call) Yes o No o DK o
2.1.3.1.3 Regular Fax Yes o No o DK o
2.1.3.1.4 Broadcast Fax Yes o No o DK o
2.1.3.1.5 E-mail Yes o No o DK o
2.1.3.1.6 None Yes o No o DK o
2.1.3.1.7 Other _______________________________
2.1.3.2 Can the system be used 24 hrs. a day, 7 days a week, if
necessary? Yes o No o DK o
2.1.3.3 Has someone tested or used the system to send health alerts Yes o No o DK o
to members of the community within the last 3 months?
2.1.3.4 Is the system adequately maintained (at least one person
assigned to maintain and update at least quarterly the list of Yes o No o DK o
community health alert recipients)?
2.1.4 Does the LPHA have written computer security policies? Yes o No o DK o
If yes, do the policies address the following:
2.1.4.1 Intruder detection Yes o No o DK o
2.1.4.2 Virus scanning Yes o No o DK o
2.1.4.3 Digital certificate or other means for authentication Yes o No o DK o
2.1.4.4 Firewall(s) to the Internet Yes o No o DK o
2.1.5 Does the LPHA have systems for safeguarding against data loss?
If yes, do they include: Yes o No o DK o
2.1.5.1 Backup electrical power Yes o No o DK o
2.1.5.2 On-site data backup arrangements Yes o No o DK o
2.1.5.3 Off-site data backup arrangements Yes o No o DK o
2.1.5.4 Power surge protection systems in place Yes o No o DK o
2.2 Indicator: Epidemiologic capacity to assess, investigate and analyze a biological, chemical or
radiological threat or emergency
2.2.1 Does the LPHS have access to Masters or Doctoral level Yes o No o DK o
epidemiologists for on-site consultation? If yes:
2.2.1.1 Do the epidemiologists have access to portable computers
with modem access during their fieldwork? Yes o No o DK o
2.2.1.2 Can data be entered into a centralized database from the field? Yes o No o DK o
2.2.2 Does the LPHA transmit reportable disease information
electronically to the state health department? Yes o No o DK o
2.2.3 Do community health professionals receive reportable disease Yes o No o DK o
summary information at least quarterly from the State or LPHA?
2.2.4 Does the LPHS receive electronic surveillance reports at least
quarterly from the state health department? Yes o No o DK o
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2.2.5 Are computer-based statistical tools used by the LPHA to detect
changes in disease patterns? Yes o No o DK o
2.2.6 Are sample epidemiologic case investigation protocols available
for the investigation of possible terrorist incidents? Yes o No o DK o
If yes, do they address:
2.2.6.1 Biological incidents Yes o No o DK o
2.2.6.2 Chemical incidents Yes o No o DK o
2.2.6.3 Radiological incidents Yes o No o DK o
2.2.7 Are sample protocols available that integrate human and Yes o No o DK o
veterinary epidemiologic investigations?
2.2.8 Has a roster of personnel with the technical expertise to respond to
a potential biological, chemical, or radiological terrorist event
been developed? Yes o No o DK o
If yes, do you have access to the following personnel within 1
hour:
2.2.8.1 Chemists Yes o No o DK o
2.2.8.2 Emergency management Yes o No o DK o
2.2.8.3 Emergency Medical Technicians / paramedics Yes o No o DK o
2.2.8.4 Environmental health scientists Yes o No o DK o
2.2.8.5 State Epidemiologist (or designee) Yes o No o DK o
2.2.8.6 Hazardous Material Response Teams Yes o No o DK o
2.2.8.7 Health physicist Yes o No o DK o
2.2.8.8 Industrial hygienists Yes o No o DK o
2.2.8.9 Infectious disease specialists Yes o No o DK o
2.2.8.10 Law enforcement Yes o No o DK o
2.2.8.11 Medical examiners/Coroner Yes o No o DK o
2.2.8.12 Microbiologists Yes o No o DK o
2.2.8.13 National Guard Yes o No o DK o
2.2.8.14 Occupational health physicians Yes o No o DK o
2.2.8.15 State Public Health Laboratory director (or designee) Yes o No o DK o
2.2.8.16 Toxicologists Yes o No o DK o
2.2.8.17 Veterinarians Yes o No o DK o
2.2.8.18 Other (Specify)
2.3 Indicator: Laboratory capacity, both public and commercial, to investigate and identify the
cause of biological, chemical, or radiological threat or public health emergency.
2.3.1 Are laboratory services available to investigate emergency
incidents within 4 hours of notification.
If yes, are laboratory services available to investigate the Yes o No o DK o
following incidents:
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2.3.1.1 Biological Yes o No o DK o
2.3.1.2 Chemical Yes o No o DK o
2.3.1.3 Radiological Yes o No o DK o
2.3.2 Does the LPHS have guidelines or protocols in place to address
the handling of laboratory specimens in the event of a biological, Yes o No o DK o
chemical or radiological incident? If yes, do they include:
2.3.2.1 Collection Yes o No o DK o
2.3.2.