Chemical Weapons

Improved Response Program

(CWIRP)

Playbook

Guidelines for Responding to and Managing a Chemical

Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorist Event

November, 2000

Prepared by:

U.S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical

Command (SBCCOM)

Domestic Preparedness Chemical Team

Disclaimer

The findings in this report are not to be construed as an official Department of the Army position unless so

designated by other authorizing documents.

The use of trade names or manufacturers' names in this report does not constitute an official endorsement of

any commercial product.  This report may not be cited for purposes of advertisement.

CWIRP Playbook

ii

Table of Contents

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Table of Contents

Table of Contents.....................................................................................................................ii

I ­ Introduction.....................................................................................................................I-1

The Chemical Weapons Improved Response Program.....................................................I-1

CWIRP Playbook Concept...............................................................................................I-2

CWIRP Playbook Outline.................................................................................................I-2

II ­ Pre-Incident Plans and Procedures ............................................................................II-1

Emergency Response.......................................................................................................II-2

Law Enforcement.............................................................................................................II-6

Health and Safety...........................................................................................................II-13

Emergency Management................................................................................................II-23

III ­ Initial Response:  The First Hour............................................................................III-1

Emergency Response......................................................................................................III-1

Law Enforcement............................................................................................................III-8

Health and Safety..........................................................................................................III-13

Emergency Management...............................................................................................III-17

IV ­ Follow-On Response:  The First Day....................................................................... IV-1

Emergency Response..................................................................................................... IV-1

Law Enforcement........................................................................................................... IV-6

Health and Safety........................................................................................................... IV-9

V ­ Long-Term Response and Recovery ...........................................................................V-1

Emergency Response.......................................................................................................V-1

Law Enforcement.............................................................................................................V-1

Health and Safety.............................................................................................................V-3

VI ­ Participating Agencies.............................................................................................. VI-1

VII ­ Program Reports.....................................................................................................VII-1

VIII ­ Supporting Information..........................................................................................VIII

Training Recommendations for Law Enforcement......................................................VIII-1

DPP Training Performance Requirements ..................................................................VIII-7

Letter from the United States Environmental Protection Agency

IX ­ Bibliography............................................................................................................... IX-1

X ­ Acronyms .......................................................................................................................X-1

Annex A ­ Guidelines for Responding to a Chemical Weapons Incident ......................A-1

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Part I ­ Introduction

The Chemical Weapons Improved Response Program

Background

As a result of the growing concerns regarding chemical/biological (C/B) terrorism,

Congress passed Public Law 104-201, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal

Year 1997.  This legislation, through Title XIV "Defense Against Weapons of Mass

Destruction," tasked the Department of Defense (DoD) to assist federal, state, and local

officials in deterrence of or response to threats or acts of weapons of mass destruction

(WMD) terrorism.  This effort is commonly referred to as the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici

(NLD) Domestic Preparedness Program (DPP).

The NLD DPP called for the following:

*

  The establishment of a training and exercise program that targets selected cities.

*

  A national hotline/helpline program designed to receive and process inquiries from the

responder community.

*

  A program designed to identify systematic deficiencies in response capabilities of the

community as a whole.

In response to the latter of these objectives, the U.S. Army Soldier and

Biological Chemical Command (SBCCOM) developed the Chemical

Weapons Improved Response Program (CWIRP).  The CWIRP partnered

with federal, state, and local emergency response personnel to identify and

resolve issues involving chemical terrorist events.  A detailed listing of the agencies

involved in the CWIRP process is contained in Part VI.

As the result of recent events, significant threats over the past few years, and the

increased availability and proliferation of nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC)

materials, there is an increasing concern for the potential of terrorist incidents

occurring in the United States involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD)."

(Congressional Record, February 26, 1997, "Report on Government Capabilities to

Respond to Terrorist Incidents Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction" ­ Message

from the President of the United States)

.

This Playbook, one of several products of the CWIRP process, serves to identify the key

issues that the program studied and provides basic recommendations and guidelines for

enhancing response and management of a chemical incident.  This document, along with

the referenced material in Part VII, provides a comprehensive collection of knowledge of

the CWIRP.  The Playbook and other referenced documents are designed to build upon the

DPP WMD training program awareness and operations training.

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The partners in the CWIRP process formed four functional groups to address the concerns

of responding to a chemical incident.  These functional groups consist of federal, state, and

local experts in the following areas:

*

  Emergency Response

*

  Law Enforcement

*

  Health and Safety

*

  Emergency Management

The CWIRP conducted a series of exercises called

Baltimore Exercise (BALTEX) that consisted of

tabletop, functional, and workshop formats to assist

members of the functional groups in recognizing the

magnitude of a chemical incident and to identify the

key issues that needed resolution.  Each functional

group, through regularly scheduled meetings and

workshops as well as the BALTEX exercises, focused

on identifying recommended procedural guidelines to

address each issue.  Many

issues also required scientific studies that were conducted by SBCCOM.  The Maryland

response community supported these studies to ensure that the results were operationally

effective.

CWIRP Playbook Concept

The issues covered in the Playbook are intended to be applicable to the majority of juris-

dictions across the country (large, small, metropolitan, rural).  Jurisdictions and agencies

using the Playbook to assist in preparation of plans, policies, and procedures for response to a

chemical WMD incident are expected to adapt these recommendations to fit their current

level of preparedness and staffing.

The Playbook is written to be as generic as possible.  Any mention or reference to an

organization or procedure specific to the Baltimore or Maryland area is strictly for

clarification and conceptual simplicity.

CWIRP Playbook Outline

The CWIRP Playbook is divided into sections that focus on the sequence of response to a

chemical incident.  These sections are separated into the following areas:

*

  Pre-Incident Plans and Procedures

*

  Initial Response ­ The First Hour

*

  Follow-On Response ­ The First Day

*

  Long-Term Response and Recovery

Each section identifies the functional group issues and recommendations as they pertain to

that stage of the response.  The subject matter experts from each functional area supporting

the CWIRP derived the list of issues; however, each jurisdiction has its own policies and

The CWIRP partnered with the city of

Baltimore to resolve issues of response to a

chemical terrorist incident.

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ways of conducting business.  While there are specific functional areas in each part of the

playbook departments and agencies should take the time to scan the issues and

recommendations from each area as certain recommendations in one functional area may

reference response agencies/actions from another.  Users of the Playbook should feel free

to adapt the subject matter it contains based on their own experience and expertise.

"The Face of Terrorism"

Though the global incidents of terrorism have waned in recent years, a new and disturbing pattern

has emerged.  Attacks have come less often, but with far greater consequence.  Tools of terror

have transformed from guns and Molotov cocktails to nerve gas, massive ammonium nitrate bombs,

and even biological weapon attacks.  Long-held taboos have been broken.  Coupled with this trend

is the prospect of state-sponsored terrorism or terrorist activity financed by wealthy individuals.

State sponsorship, access to significant financial resources, heightened scientific and technical

prowess, and access to information available on pathways such as the Internet may all combine to

breach the notion of a technological "glass ceiling" for terrorists.  Today's terrorist has the potential

to be far more deadly than ever before.

Within the United States, the potential for the use of weapon(s) of mass destruction (WMD) by

terrorists has become a major national security concern.  The spread of international terrorism has

long been a major threat, but law enforcement and intelligence officials are increasingly concerned

about the rise of groups or persons within extremist movements in the United States.  Fringe ele-

ments and various persons within these extremist movements in the United States are examples of

this new threat.  Bombings in Atlanta, GA, and Birmingham, AL, as well as a rash of biological agent

hoaxes in 1998 and 1999, have amplified this concern.  These events and concern about the poten-

tial for WMD terrorism warrant increasing vigilance and preparedness.

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Part II ­ Pre-Incident Plans and Procedures

The ability of an agency to respond to and effectively manage a chemical WMD incident

begins with the development of departmental plans, procedures, and training.  Preparation

for responding to a chemical incident should begin with modifying existing plans and

procedures to consider and include WMD-specific operations.  A chemical terrorist

incident is different from a routine HazMat incident in that the terrorist incident:

*

  Is deliberate in nature.

*

  Is a criminal act.

*

  Is designed to produce a large number of casualties.

*

  Is expected to result in a large number of fatalities.

*

  Will require mass numbers of people to be decontaminated.

This section outlines the issues and recommendations that departments should consider in

advance of the actual occurrence of a chemical incident.  These recommendations are based

on the assumption that individuals have a basic knowledge of chemical agent awareness

and emergency response operations.  This information is provided as part of the NLD DPP

city "Train-the-Trainer" program.

Throughout the Playbook, constant reference is made to the need for

communications between the various responding agencies.  This com-

munication is extremely important to the fire, police, and medical agencies

as they rely heavily on each other to successfully manage such an incident.

For this communications flow to be effective in an actual response, it must

be practiced in multiagency drills and exercises.

It should be noted that agencies should only consider operating in a

chemically hazardous environment after thorough training and with

proper equipment.  Several recommendations are made throughout the

Playbook regarding roles, levels of operation, and personal protective

equipment (PPE).  Departments that do not have trained and equipped personnel to perform

such operations should not enter a chemical incident scene.  The importance of proper

equipment and adherence to PPE safety standards, including respirator fit-test

requirements, cannot be overemphasized.

If we have a free path, we go forward.

If we meet an obstacle, we go around it.

If the object cannot be overcome, we retreat.

When the enemy is unprepared, we surprise him.

If he is alert, we leave him alone.

Quote from the German Terrorist Group Bader Meinhoff

Multiagency commu-

nications pose a major

challenge between

local, state and federal

responders.

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General

Issue:  Funding for Chemical Protective Equipment

Other than knowledge and awareness of the hazards associated with responding to a

chemical WMD incident, the major issue facing response organizations is the procurement

and maintenance of protective equipment.  Studies indicate that the respiratory protection

most law enforcement agencies currently use for riot control are not suitable for chemical

agents and in some cases are prohibited from use by federal safety standards.  Other

departments may not have any PPE at all (EMS).

Recommendation.

  Funding for equipment necessary to respond to a C/B event may be

available through the federal grant process.  The National Domestic Preparedness Office

(NDPO) developed a Standardized Equipment List (SEL) to be considered by response

agencies.  Each jurisdiction should have a representative responsible for collecting and

coordinating federal grant requests, and interfacing with state grant POCs.  Agencies

should contact their city or county emergency management office or Mayor or County

Executive's office to identify their representative.  Many grants are now being executed at

the state level.

Issue:  Terrorism Response Plans

Each department and level of law enforcement (local through state) should have a terrorism

response plan that encompasses department-specific guidelines in preparing for and

responding to acts of terrorism.  These plans should also include information specific to

WMD incidents.

Recommendation.

  Municipalities should develop WMD terrorism response plans after a

thorough assessment is made of their vulnerabilities.  This assessment should outline and

identify key areas or events that present targets of opportunity for terrorists.  Key historical

dates and events, large public gatherings, and locations or meetings with political, social, or

ethnic agendas are only a few of the targets likely to provide terrorists a means to present

their message. Many states and jurisdictions are conducting these assessments as part of a

DOJ grant process.

Plans should outline specific notifications that are to be made once an act of chemical

terrorism occurs.  These should include local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies

as well as local notifications necessary to support the response.  Typical types of local

notifications may include medical treatment facilities, local health department, fire

department, HazMat teams, city and county emergency management, and nearby military

bases.  Any act of suspected terrorism should be reported immediately to the nearest

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) field office.  FBI field offices have appointed agents

to perform as WMD coordinators for their region.  Additionally, field offices supporting

the larger metropolitan jurisdictions have trained and equipped these agents to perform

limited HazMat operations in support of the local jurisdiction until the arrival of more

specialized elements such as the FBI Hazardous Materials Response Unit (HMRU).

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Issue:  Recall of Emergency Response Personnel

Private ambulance corporations, security agencies, and volunteer fire companies often have

a population of part-time civil servant employees who hold full-time positions at other

emergency agencies (e.g., police, fire, EMS).  During a disaster, many of these people will

be recalled to their primary job. This loss of manpower will hinder the ability of private

companies to respond to the normal day-to-day operations and leave them unable to

provide requested backup to the incident site.  Additionally, many of these individuals also

hold positions in their State National Guard.  This is particularly true in the security, law

enforcement, and medical areas.

Recommendation.

  Agencies should have an accurate count of their personnel who

provide emergency service in other capacities.  Having a solid understanding of their

resource status during a crisis is paramount to supplying a service during a disaster.

Coordination should be made with the State National Guard Headquarters to determine what

their recall procedures will be in the event of a local MCI.  Several have already determined

that they will not recall their personnel who fill emergency positions in the community.  They

would rather allow them to continue to provide support as part of the community's resources.

This, however, should be verified within each jurisdiction and not assumed.

Emergency Response

Issue:  Training

Emergency responders (e.g., fire, police, medical) must be trained and prepared to handle

any emergency.  The responder should have, as a minimum requirement, training that

consists of or is equivalent to the awareness and operations level training from the DPP

Train-the-Trainer course.  All personnel must be aware that a terrorist event can happen

anytime anywhere.

Recommendation.

  Responding to a mass-casualty chemical WMD event will place

standard firefighters in positions of possible chemical exposure that are normally only

experienced by trained hazardous materials (HazMat) operators.  All emergency response

agencies should have a designated training officer who will be responsible for all aspects of

training and updated information. Recommended training includes PPE, positive pressure

ventilation (PPV), decontamination, the use of chemical detectors, and chemical agent

information. The reports developed by the Domestic Preparedness Improved Response

Program are excellent references and are readily available via the SBCCOM Web site

(http://www2.sbccom.army.mil/hld).

Additional training areas and recommendations can be obtained from the training

performance requirements outlined for the Domestic Preparedness city training program.

These objectives are listed in Part VIII of this document.

Additionally, any chemical terrorist event will require close cooperation between the  fire

and law enforcement agencies involved.  These agencies should work together to conduct

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joint training exercises that focus on the supporting roles that each must accomplish to

ensure an effective and safe response.

Issue:  Personnel Protective Equipment For  Fire / EMS / HazMat

One important aspect of response to any chemical incident is the

assurance of proper personal protection equipment for all

responders.  Test and evaluation studies completed by SBCCOM

on PPE have suggested that fire and emergency medical services

(EMS) personnel may use firefighter turnout gear with self-

contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) as minimal protection

against chemical agents for quick response.  The responder must

realize that this practice in no way replaces the requirements for

PPE for HazMat operations.  This practice is only to be used for a

limited timeframe and considered as an alternate means of quick

rescue of 

known live victims

.

Rescue personnel may be required to use specialized rescue equipment in addition to

standard firefighter turnout gear. This equipment may include rescue helmets, harnesses,

gloves, and ropes. Rescuers must use caution to protect such equipment from being directly

exposed to liquid chemical contamination. EMS personnel, in addition to full turnout gear

and SCBA, must also use additional EMS personal protection as required.  This includes

eye protection, butyl rubber gloves, and respiratory protection against not only chemical

agents but also bloodborne pathogens and contagious diseases.  HazMat technicians should

operate in their normal levels of protection based on the chemical threat for HazMat

operations.

Recommendation.

  All responders should be trained in proper use and types of PPE for

any chemical agent incident appropriate for their role and responsibilities in a response.

SCBA is the suggested type of respiratory protection equipment for all fire, EMS, rescue,

and HazMat personnel.  The SBCCOM report, 

Guidelines for Incident Commander's Use

of Firefighter Protective Ensemble (FFPE) with Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus

(SCBA) for Rescue Operations During a Terrorist Chemical Agent Incident,

 is an excellent

guideline to use for rescue operations on a chemical agent incident.  The Emergency

Response Functional Group also recommends that all emergency responders receive the

basic WMD Awareness and Operations Training developed by the DPP.  A list of DPP

performance requirements are included in Part VIII of this document.

Issue:  Decontamination

A chemical WMD incident may result in a massive number of people who may require

decontamination.  For decontamination to be effective, it must be rendered immediately.

Firefighters need to be trained and prepared to perform mass-casualty decontamination

prior to an incident.

CWIRP studies indicate that

turnout gear with SCBA pro-

vides sufficient protection to

conduct rescue of live casualties

with minimal risk to firefighters.

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Large volumes of water are necessary

to have any effect on removing agent

from the skin.

Incident casualties will need to be prioritized for decontamination based on the likelihood

of exposure.  Additionally, emergency medical triage must be performed to ensure that

those requiring immediate or urgent medical care are administered to first.

After emergency triage and prioritization of casualties, the first step of

decontamination is to remove as much clothing as the casualties will

allow.  Studies indicate that up to 80 percent of the contamination on a

victim will be removed by disrobing.  Convincing the populace to do

so will be a challenge to responders.  It is also essential that the

responders provide as much privacy and gender segregation as possible

based on the resources available and amount of agent exposure to the

victims.

A bleach solution is not recommended for mass-casualty

decontamination operation by civiliam responders because of these

factors:

*

  Bleach solutions may degrade the skin surface allowing greater penetration of the

chemical warfare agent (CWA) into the body.

*

  Flushing with 

large volumes

 of water at low pressure is highly effective in removing

surface contamination and is readily available to any fire department.

Recommendation.

  For decontamination to be effective for saving lives from rapid acting

agents such as GB (sarin) nerve agent, it must be instituted within minutes of exposure.

Responders are expected to be able to perform such decontamination only if they are

already on the scene when the agent is dispersed.  Such instances could include an advance

warning of a chemical device, prestaged apparatus/responder at a credible threat location,

and backup response element to a tactical takedown of a suspected chemical terrorist or

laboratory facility.  Outside of immediate response and lifesaving, decontamination is also

necessary for more persistent agents such as VX nerve and mustard agents, to prevent

cross-contamination between casualties and with rescue personnel and healthcare

providers.

The CWIRP 

Guidelines for Mass Casualty Decontamination During a Terrorist Chemical

Agent Incident

 report outlines several approaches to the establishment of decontamination

systems.  Departments should carefully evaluate the types

of systems outlined in the report and evaluate what levels of

decontamination they can accomplish based on their

resources.  Additional equipment may be procured for mass

decontamination operations through the federal grant

process.  Mass-casualty decontamination must then be

incorporated into the department's normal training

program.

Studies into the effectiveness of decontamination with

water have looked at two aspects of the decontamination

process:  the volume of water required and the time a

Disrobing provides approx-

imately 80 percent of agent

removal during decontam-

ination.

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victim should remain in the shower to effectively flush an agent from the skin.  Preliminary

results indicate that a large volume of water is necessary to adequately flush agent

simulants from the skin.  This represents the type of water flow that is provided with fire

hoses at a low-pressure setting.  Lesser volumes of water, such as that provided by a garden

hose or mist sprayer only wet the victim's skin and do little to actually remove the agent.

The CWIRP continues to work on further issues involving mass-casualty decontamination.

These issues include the following:

*

  Other means of decontamination to include dry decontaminants.

*

  Cold weather decontamination.

Issue:  Equipment Resources

The response to a chemical WMD incident is expected to be both manpower and resource

intensive.  A community's level of support can rapidly be overwhelmed.  The additional

threat of equipment contamination and the requirement to take such equipment out of

service for a prolonged period of time can further inhibit the ability to provide normal

service to the area.  Additional, specialized equipment will also be needed as part of the

chemical response.

Recommendation.  

The Emergency Response Functional Group agreed that the more

resources available to the Incident Commander (IC) the better the response to any overall

emergency operation could be performed.

Limited stocks of specialized chemical response equipment may be stored on individual

apparatus.  Backup supplies should be immediately available from in-house stocks and a

local network of suppliers and manufactures.  Communities should identify what special-

ized equipment is available regionally to identify military-specific chemical agents.  Most

HazMat teams have similar types of commercial agent detectors, but they may have limited

or no military agent detection capabilities.  Every HazMat team should have the basic

chemical agent detectors (e.g., M8, M9 paper).  These are the simplest form of detectors

that any team can use to gain some possible indication of a chemical warfare agent.  Other

types of detectors such as colorimetric tubes are available and can easily be stored and used

by a local HazMat team.  Identifying and equipping a regional response asset with

enhanced detection equipment for suspected military agents increases the local commu-

nity's ability to provide a more accurate agent identification prior to the arrival of state or

federal resources.

To further deal with the immediate needs during a response, jurisdictions should reevaluate

their mutual-aid agreements to determine if any adjustments need to be made in the case of

a chemical WMD incident.  A list of specialized equipment available in the surrounding

areas that may be needed for a chemical response should be established and updated as

needed.  A method of rapidly determining the serviceability of such equipment should also

be developed.  Prestaging of such resources may be accomplished in preparation for a

special event or in the event of any increased threat of chemical terrorism in an area.  To be

effective, these types of lists must be readily available to the IC.

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A list of suppliers, dealers, and manufactures of fire, EMS, rescue, and HazMat equipment

and emergency vehicles is beneficial when equipment or apparatus are declared nonservice-

able.  This will reduce the time necessary to locate, order, and replace the required equipment

or vehicles.  In addition, a manpower resource list including department, agency, local, state,

and federal names to contact for assistance in expediting emergency requisitions.

Issue:  Accountability and Identification

A key component of the Incident Command System (ICS) is the need for accountability.

Accountability of emergency personnel, equipment, and apparatus and the identification of

victims and personal property are essential.  Each sector, as part of its area of operations,

should establish some form of accountability and provide the command post (CP) regular

status updates.  These status reports will permit the CP to quickly gain information and

enable the IC to evaluate the overall resources and make any adjustments necessary to

control the incident.

Recommendation.

  In preparing for any incident, it is suggested that all fire, rescue,

HazMat, and EMS personnel understand the importance of accountability and to have in

place good methods of identification.  One method of personnel accountability widely used

throughout the fire service is the Personal Accountability Tag (PAT).  It is suggested that

other response agencies incorporate some form of personnel accountability into their

standard practice.

Response agencies should have and maintain supplies for the identification of victims and

personal property.  A form of bar-coded or sequentially numbered triage tags with peel-

and-stick labels is recommended for tagging bags of personal property and other reports so

that they can easily be identified without recording each casualty's pertinent information

(e.g., name and address) each time.

Law Enforcement

Issue:  Pre-Incident  Intelligence Sharing

Intelligence information is one of the most important aspects of law enforcement

operations to prevent criminal and terrorist events.  Information gathering and tracking of

individuals suspected of possible criminal intent are key to providing a safer community

for our citizens to live in.  To provide a complete understanding of the threat, a close infor-

mation-sharing network should be established between local and state law enforcement

jurisdictions.

Recommendation.

  Law enforcement agencies should designate one or more investigators

or officers within their intelligence unit to focus on threats of terrorism.  One individual in

this network should be responsible for disseminating information to other agencies that are

affected.  This person should be on the notification lists of private (including defense

contractors and C/B research facilities) and public organizations (including fire

departments, hospitals, public health, public alerting systems) who may obtain information

concerning problems or suspicious circumstances that are relevant to law enforcement

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The M17 series mask

was phased out of

military use beginning

in 1991.

intelligence.  It is further recommended that regular intelligence reports be disseminated to

the field to keep personnel and commanders informed of trends, symbols, and officer safety

information.

A regional intelligence network on terrorism consisting of federal, state, and local law

enforcement is recommended.  This regional network will keep all levels of law

enforcement informed of potential threats or trends that might cross jurisdictional

boundaries.  Neighboring states should establish an additional network for sharing similar

information on trends or threats.  In most cases, the likely point of contact (POC) should

come from the state police intelligence unit who should act as the conduit between local,

state, and federal agencies.

Law enforcement agencies must also consider what, if any, intelligence information can be

shared outside of the law enforcement community.  If intelligence indicates that an

imminent threat exists, pre-notification to response units could aid in the overall response

and safety of responders.  The sharing of intelligence outside of law enforcement agencies

is strictly at the discretion of law enforcement.

Issue:  Personal Protective Equipment for Law Enforcement Officers

PPE for officers was a topic of much debate and discussion

among the program's participants and organizations.  Police

officers have experience with respiratory protection through

their use of gas masks for riot control.  The threat of

chemical terrorism however, clearly opens up previously

unexplored protection requirements for law enforcement.

Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)

respiratory requirements have been mostly overlooked when

dealing with riot control masks.  Results of this can lead to

an improperly fitted mask or a poorly trained officer.  In a

riot control situation this may pose an inconvenience only to

the responding officer; however, the same problem could result in death in a chemical

incident response.  OSHA Regulations (Standards­29 Code of Federal Regulations [CFR])

1910.134 define requirements for respiratory protection; however, there are no OSHA

standards for Chemical Warfare Agents for civilian respirators.

Many departments possess and use M17-style military surplus masks for

their riot control protection primarily because they can be obtained at

minimal or no cost.  These masks are old, replacement parts are hard to

find, and many are unserviceable. Testing a selection of masks used by

several departments validated these points.  The program conducted two

tests on the M17 masks that several departments currently were using for

riot control purposes.

The first test focused on the serviceability of the masks according to

military serviceability standards for chemical warfare agent (CWA)

protection.  Test findings indicated that masks did not have CWA filters

Mask fit requirements present a major

challenge to departments; however

compliance is essential to officer

safety.

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Affordable, quality protection was the

goal of the CWIRP law enforcement PPE

study.

in them (two of the three filters developed for these masks were for riot control agents

only), were dry rotted, and/or had unserviceable components.  Even after the masks were

rebuilt with serviceable components, one-third of them failed to achieve a seal on the test

and evaluation machine.

The second test involved evaluating the fit of the mask to the officers based on the OSHA

1910.134 fit test requirements.  Officers were issued masks according to department

procedure and donned them based on their current level of training.  Even after assistance

in properly donning the masks, almost half of the participants were unable to achieve a

proper seal to National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) standards.

The Law Enforcement Functional Group started their investigation of overall officer PPE

with two factors in mind:

1.  Recommending levels of protection based on the expected role of the officer in

responding to a WMD incident.

2.  Identifying protective equipment that is affordable, easy to maintain, and capable of

withstanding the rigors placed on it by the officers.

Recommendation.

  PPE was recommended based on the following:

1.  The roles of law enforcement in the chemical incident response.

2.  The likelihood of contamination in each of these roles.

The basic patrol officer is expected to operate primarily on the

outer perimeter of the contaminated area and should encounter

little or no contamination.  However, because cross-

contamination from victims, wind shifts, and secondary agent

releases could further spread the contaminant, protection is

essential.  Patrol officers may also be called upon to perform

limited duties in support of decontamination operations on the

outer limits of the warm zone.

Testing was conducted using five protective suits and one

officer in standard duty uniform.  The ensembles also con-

sisted of a negative-pressure respirator (MCU2P), butyl rubber gloves, and butyl rubber

boots.  Officers performed motions and functions that they would expect to conduct while

operating on the perimeter of a chemical incident (directing traffic and crowd control).

Protection afforded from the suits ranged from 17 to 42 times that of an unprotected test

subject.

Operations in areas of increased agent concentration require better protective equipment

and rely on increased awareness and safe operating procedures to ensure protection of

officers.  Because of this, specially trained teams are recommended for these missions.

The primary recommendation was for Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams and

other specialized teams to fulfill this role since they are already familiar with enhanced

training, equipment, and tactics.

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SBCCOM, with the cooperation of Maryland State Police Special Tactical Assault Team

Element (STATE), conducted a series of tests on several protective ensembles for the basic

patrol officer.  The results of these tests and a more detailed discussion of PPE issues for

law enforcement are documented in a report entitled 

Personal Protective Equipment

Guidelines for Use by Law Enforcement Officers at a Terrorist Chemical Agent Incident.

This report when finalized will be available on the SBCCOM Web site

www2.sbccom.army.mil/hld.

Issue:  SWAT Tactics and Protective Equipment

Exercises conducted by the IRP and the 120-city training program have brought attention

to issues that may require the conduct of tactical law enforcement operations inside of a

contaminated area.  Such operations may consist of operating in an area where chemical

agents have already been released, or where the potential for release is high, i.e. suspected

production laboratory (cookhouse) or dignitary protection.

Clothing worn by tactical officers must meet the needs of the mission and be compatible

with specialized equipment and tactics.  Tactical operations require stealth, a high degree

of dexterity, and unencumbered movement.  Additionally, the specialized tactical

equipment and techniques used by officers can easily tear clothing that is not designed to

withstand the rigors of such operations.

Inherently all chemical protective ensembles are cumbersome and hinder communications,

dexterity and vision.  Many commercial types of protective ensembles however clearly do

not lend themselves to tactical operations due to their visibility (bright colors), noisiness of

the fabric, and short duration of operation from limited bottled air supplies.

Recommendation

.  Operating in a contaminated environment requires specific training

and knowledge on protective equipment and procedures.  As such, it is recommended that

departments train members of each of their tactical teams to the HazMat technician level.

This is similar to training team members to be "tactical medics".  This training would give

each team the ability to perform operations such as detection and sampling in conjunction

with their tactical mission as the situation and time permits.  This can aid in reducing the

time necessary to determine the specific agent involved and the extent of contamination.

This would also give each team a more definitive understanding of the decontamination

process as it pertains to chemical contamination.

Charcoal impregnated or lined protective suits or chemical protective undergarments are best suited

to the tactical officer and their operations.  The types of chemical protective ensembles depicted

include left-Level C charcoal impregnated overgarment, center-Level A, and right-Level B

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In order to meet the challenges of tactical operations the CWIRP chose to evaluate several

styles and types of charcoal lined/impregnated protective suits and chemical protective

undergarments for tactical officers.  These types of suits are highly durable, provide very

good chemical protection and meet the needs of the tactical officer well.  They include

chemical protective suits currently in use by the U.S. military and similar types.  Unlike

suits recommended for patrol officers, the charcoal style suites afford a greater degree of

durability to tactical operations such as crouching, repelling, and climbing.

Basic OSHA safety requirements indicate that Level A protection (fully encapsulated suit

with self-contained breathing apparatus) is required when an unknown agent or

concentration is present.  If there are any threats of suspects or additional

explosive/chemical devices being in the incident area, HazMat teams are expected to refuse

to enter the area until it is cleared by law enforcement.  Therefore it is expected that the

agent and concentration will not be known and that victim signs and symptoms will be the

only indicator of the hazards.

Level A and Level B protection (both requiring SCBA respiratory protection) do not

support tactical law enforcement operations.  Suits used with Level A and B protection are

noisy and generally bright in color, also not lending to stealth operations.  While these

types of suits can be special ordered from most manufacturers in any color specified, this

would not eliminate the noise issue.  In addition, the fabric of these suits tear easily and is

not expected to withstand even the simplest of tactical maneuvers.  SCBA provides for a

limited operation based on the air supply whereby officers may be required to disengage

from their mission against standard procedures.  This is particularly true during stealth

operations or when confronting a suspect.  Level A protection also does not lend to firing

shoulder fired weapons.

SBCCOM, in conjunction with the Maryland State Police, is conducting testing on

protective ensembles (equivalent to Level C protection) for SWAT teams.  This testing is

similar to the procedures done for ensembles for patrol officers on the perimeter of an

incident.  The ensembles being testing include a negative-pressure respirator, butyl rubber

gloves and either a charcoal lined/impregnated suit or chemical protective undergarments.

The chemical undergarments are worn under the SWAT officers' uniform.  Chemical suits

are of the military style and include those currently in use by the military as well as others

that have been developed for several law enforcement agencies.  These style suits provide a

better fit with the tactical mission and equipment.

The tests evaluate the ensembles based on the chemical agent protection provided as well

as compatibility with the teams equipment and tactics.  Results of the testing will be

published in an overall law enforcement PPE report and be available on the SBCCOM Web

site at www2.sbccom.army.mil/hld when testing is completed.

Issue:  Bomb Squad Tactics and Protective Equipment

Bomb technicians face critical challenges of both agent and explosive hazards when

confronted with conventional improvised explosive devices (IED) inside of a contaminated

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area or with chemical IEDs.  The requirement to search for and possibly dispose of

chemical and/or conventional IEDs is expected to accompany any chemical WMD

incident.  Most bomb technicians are not trained or equipped to operate in a chemically

contaminated environment.  Standard bomb suits do not provide for any form of chemical

protection and already present the wearer with high danger of heat related injury.

Recommendation:  

As with the recommendation for tactical teams, it is recommended that

bomb technicians be trained to the HazMat technician level

There are few chemical/biological (C/B) bomb suits available on the market.  These suits

are relatively expensive and while providing chemical agent protection in the form of

wearing a chemical protective suit and respirator under the suit, afford only approximately

70 percent of the standard blast protection of a standard suit.  Recommendations from the

manufacturers of these suits also indicate that the filters of a negative-pressure respirator

used in conjunction with a C/B bomb suit are subject to damage from a detonation that can

render the filters unserviceable.  As such, SCBA is their recommendation for respiratory

protection.

This type of ensemble presents various limitations for the technician.  SCBA limits the time

on target for conducting evaluations and render safe procedures to the limits of the air

supply