The Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons
of Mass Destruction was established by Section 1405 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1999, Public Law 105261 (H.R. 3616, 105th Congress, 2nd Session) (October
17, 1998). That Act directed that a federally funded research and development center provide
research, analytical, and other support to the Advisory Panel during the course of its activities
and deliberations. RAND has been providing that support, under contract from the Department
of Defense, since the Advisory Panel's inception. A full description of the Advisory Panel's
deliberative process, research methods, and work plan appears as Appendix C.
This Second Annual Report is a document of the Advisory Panel, not a RAND publication. It was
prepared and edited by RAND professional staff and is being submitted for review and comment
within the U.S. Government Interagency process. It is not copyrighted but does contain material
from copyrighted sources. Copies of the report may also be obtained via the Internet at:
http://www.rand.org/organization/nsrd/terrpanel
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Second Annual Report to
The President and The Congress
Of the
ADVISORY PANEL TO ASSESS DOMESTIC
RESPONSE CAPABILITIES FOR
TERRORISM INVOLVING WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION
II. TOWARD A
NATIONAL STRATEGY
FOR COMBATING TERRORISM
15 December 2000
THE ADVISORY PANEL TO ASSESS DOMESTIC RESPONSE CAPABILITIES FOR
TERRORISM INVOLVING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
James S. Gilmore, III December 15, 2000
Chairman
James Clapper, Jr. To Our Readers:
Vice Chairman
I am pleased to provide the Second Annual Report of the
L. Paul Bremer Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for
Raymond Downey Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, as our
Richard Falkenrath Congressional mandate requires.
George Foresman Contemplating the specter of terrorism in this country is a
William Garrison sobering-but critically necessary-responsibility of government
Ellen M. Gordon officials at all levels. It is a truly "national" issue that requires
James Greenleaf synchronization of our efforts-"vertically" among the federal,
William Jenaway state, and local levels, and "horizontally" among the functional
William Dallas Jones constituent stakeholders. The individual capabilities of all
critical elements must be brought to bear in a much more
Paul M. Maniscalco coherent way than is now the case. That fundamental tenet
John O. Marsh, Jr. underlies our work over the last two years.
Kathleen O'Brien
M. Patricia Quinlisk We are impelled by the stark realization that a terrorist attack on
some level inside our borders is inevitable and the United States
Patrick Ralston must be ready. We are similarly convinced, however, that much
William Reno of the legitimate fear associated with the prospect of a terrorist
Joseph Samuels, Jr. attack can be substantially reduced.
Kenneth Shine
Hubert Williams Improving our ability to address the threat and reducing the fear
Ellen Embrey* of citizens and government leaders is possible if-and only if-
we are willing to take bold action as a nation. Specifically, we
must:
* U.S. Department of
Defense Representative * craft a truly "national" strategy to address the threat of
domestic terrorism-conventional, cyber, chemical,
biological, radiological and nuclear-from the
perspectives of deterrence, prevention, preparedness and
response;
* empower a senior authority to be in charge of our overall
planning and preparation in the Federal Executive
Branch, with special emphasis on preserving our civil
liberties in a time of emergency;
James S. Gilmore, III * consolidate the Congressional approach to legislation
Chairman governing domestic preparedness for such attacks;
James Clapper, Jr.
Vice Chairman * concentrate much more serious attention on state and
local concerns and capabilities; and
L. Paul Bremer
Raymond Downey * strengthen functional capabilities across all levels of
Richard Falkenrath government for intelligence collection and information
George Foresman sharing; planning; training, equipping and exercising;
research and development; health and medical; and across
William Garrison all first responder stakeholders-fire, law enforcement,
Ellen M. Gordon emergency medical services and emergency management.
James Greenleaf
William Jenaway These five imperatives represent the major themes in this report.
We stress in the strongest terms that their implementation must
William Dallas Jones always hold in strict regard the preservation of our Constitution
Paul M. Maniscalco and the complete protection of our civil liberties. We steadfastly
John O. Marsh, Jr. adhere to the bedrock principle that these considerations must
Kathleen O'Brien always transcend what might be more efficient or expedient.
M. Patricia Quinlisk It is clear to us that our nation collectively will have to make
Patrick Ralston some significant resource commitments and overcome daunting
William Reno technological challenges if we are successfully to confront this
Joseph Samuels, Jr. threat in all dimensions. I submit, however, that our most
Kenneth Shine imposing challenge centers on policy and whether we have the
Hubert Williams collective fortitude to forge change, both in organization as well
as process. We are convinced the changes we recommend are
Ellen Embrey* essential to ensure the safety and security of our nation.
* U.S. Department of
Defense Representative Respectfully,
James S. Gilmore, III
Governor of Virginia
Chairman
Please address comments or questions to:
RAND
1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, Virginia 22202-5050 Telephone 703-413-1100 FAX 703-413-8111
The Federally-Funded Research and Development Center providing support to the Advisory Panel
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction
CONTENTS
Letter from the Chairman
Contents................................................................................................................................i
Executive Summary.............................................................................................................ii
Chapter One-Forging a National Strategy.........................................................................1
Identifying the Ends of Strategy: National Goals ........................................................5
Developing the Means of Strategy: Program Structure and Priorities.........................6
Chapter Two-Getting the Federal House in Order............................................................7
Improving Federal Executive Branch Coordination....................................................7
Improving Coordination in the Congress...................................................................16
Chapter Three-Improving Functional Capabilities.........................................................19
Collecting Intelligence, Assessing Threats, and Sharing Information.......................19
Planning, Coordinating, and Operating Cooperatively..............................................23
Training, Equipping, and Exercising .........................................................................29
Improving Health and Medical Capabilities ..............................................................32
Promoting Better Research and Development and
Developing National Standards .....................................................................36
Enhancing Efforts to Counter Agricultural Terrorism...............................................39
Providing Cyber Security Against Terrorism............................................................40
Conclusion.........................................................................................................................45
Table of Appendices ..........................................................................................................46
List of Key Recommendations.................................................................Inside Back Cover
i
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction
Executive Summary
We have been fortunate as a nation. The terrorist incidents in this country-
however tragic-have occurred so rarely that the foundations of our society or
our form of government have not been threatened. Nevertheless, the potential
for terrorist attacks inside the borders of the United States is a serious emerging
threat. There is no guarantee that our comparatively secure domestic sanctuary
will always remain so. Because the stakes are so high, our nation's leaders must
take seriously the possibility of an escalation of terrorist violence against the
homeland.
The continuing challenge for the United States is first to deter and, failing that, to
detect and interdict terrorists before they strike. Should an attack occur, local,
State, and Federal authorities must be prepared to respond and mitigate the
consequences of the attack.
To prepare to manage the consequences of such attacks effectively, the United
States needs changes in the relationships among all levels of government. Our
ability to respond cannot depend on a single level or agency of government.
Rather we need a national approach, one that recognizes the unique individual
skills that communities, States, and the Federal government possess and that,
collectively, will give us the "total package" needed to address all aspects of
terrorism.
The Advisory Panel produced a comprehensive assessment, in its first report, of
the terrorist threat. The Panel stands by its conclusions from one year ago.
In its second year, the Advisory Panel shifted its emphasis from threat
assessment to broad program assessment. The Advisory Panel addressed
specific programs for combating terrorism and larger questions of national
strategy and Federal organization. While the Advisory Panel found much to
commend, it also found problems at all levels of government and in virtually
every functional discipline relevant to combating terrorism. The Panel believes
these problems are particularly acute at high levels of the Federal Executive
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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction
Branch. Hence, the present report highlights the related issues of national
strategy and Federal organization, and recommends solutions for these and
other problems.
Finding 1: The United States has no coherent, functional national
strategy for combating terrorism.
The United States needs a functional, coherent national strategy for domestic
preparedness against terrorism. The nation has a loosely coupled set of plans
and specific programs that aim, individually, to achieve certain specific
preparedness objectives. The Executive Branch portrays as its strategy a
compilation of broad policy statements, and various plans and programs already
under way. Many programs have resulted from specific Congressional earmarks
in various appropriations bills and did not originate in Executive Branch budget
requests; they are the initiatives of activist legislators. Although Federal
agencies are administering programs assigned to them, the Executive Branch
has not articulated a broad functional national strategy that would synchronize
the existing programs and identify future program priorities needed to achieve
national objectives for domestic preparedness for terrorism. Given the structure
of our national government, only the Executive Branch can produce such a
national strategy.
Recommendation 1: The next President should develop and present to
the Congress a national strategy for combating terrorism within one
year of assuming office.
A national strategy is a high-level statement of national objectives coupled
logically to a statement of the means that will be used to achieve these
objectives. In a coherent strategy, program details are analytically derived from
the statement of goals. The next Administration should begin a process of
developing a national strategy by a thoughtful articulation of national goals,
encompassing deterrence, prevention, preparedness, and response.
Ends. The first step in developing a coherent national strategy is for the
Executive Branch to define a meaningful, measurable expression of what it is
trying to achieve in combating terrorism. To date, the Federal government's
goals have been expressed primarily in terms of program execution. Rather, the
national strategy must express goals in terms of the "end state" toward which the
program strives. Since there exists no ready-made measure of a country's
preparedness for terrorism (especially domestically), the Executive Branch must
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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction
develop objective measurements for its program to combat terrorism, to track its
progress, to determine priorities and appropriate funding levels, and to know
when the desired "end state" has been achieved.
Means. With meaningful objectives, logical priorities and appropriate policy
prescriptions can be developed. That is the essence of any coherent strategy.
Setting priorities is essential and can only be done after specific objectives have
been clearly defined. For instance, should the nation seek a higher level of
preparedness for its large urban centers than for its rural areas and, if so, how
much higher? In the broad area of terrorism preparedness, what should be the
relative importance of preparing for conventional terrorism, radiological incidents,
chemical weapons, or biological weapons? With respect to biological weapons,
which pathogens deserve priority? What priority and commensurate resources
need to be devoted to defending against cyber attacks? A proper national
strategy will provide a clear answer to these and many other questions. With
these answers in hand it will be possible to design and manage an appropriate
set of programs. The country is at a disadvantage, of course, in that a large
number of programs have already been established and may have to be
reconfigured-an inevitable consequence of their ad hoc origins.
Essential Characteristics of a Comprehensive
Functional Strategy for Combating Terrorism
NATIONAL IN SCOPE, NOT JUST FEDERAL
APPROPRIATELY RESOURCED AND BASED ON
MEASURABLE PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES
FOCUSED ON THE FULL RANGE OF DETERRENCE, PREVENTION,
PREPAREDNESS, AND RESPONSE ACROSS THE
SPECTRUM OF THREATS-DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL
FOR DOMESTIC PROGRAMS, BUILT ON REQUIREMENTS FROM AND FULLY
COORDINATED WITH RELEVANT LOCAL, STATE, AND FEDERAL AUTHORITIES
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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction
Finding 2: The organization of the Federal government's programs for
combating terrorism is fragmented, uncoordinated, and politically
unaccountable.
The lack of a national strategy results in part from the fragmentation of Executive
Branch programs for combating terrorism. These programs cross an
extraordinary number of jurisdictions and substantive domains: national security,
law enforcement, intelligence, emergency management, fire protection, public
health, medical care, as well as parts of the private sector.
No one, at any level, is "in charge" of all relevant capabilities, most of which are
not dedicated exclusively to combating terrorism. The lack of a national strategy
is inextricably linked to the fact that no entity has the authority to direct all of the
entities that may be engaged. At the Federal level, no entity has the authority
even to direct the coordination of relevant Federal efforts.
Recommendation 2: The next President should establish a National
Office for Combating Terrorism in the Executive Office of the President,
and should seek a statutory basis for this office.
The office should have a broad and comprehensive scope, with responsibility for
the full range of deterring, preventing, preparing for, and responding to
international as well as domestic terrorism. The director of this office should be
the principal spokesman of the Executive Branch on all matters related to
Federal programs for combating terrorism and should be appointed by the
President and confirmed by the Senate. The office should have a substantial
and professional staff, drawn from existing National Security Council offices and
other relevant agencies. It should have at least five major sections, each headed
by an Assistant Director:
1. Domestic Preparedness Programs
2. Intelligence
3. Health and Medical Programs
4. Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E), and National
Standards
5. Management and Budget
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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction
The National Office for Combating Terrorism should exercise program and
budget authority over Federal efforts to combat terrorism. It should have the
authority to conduct a review of Federal agency programs and budgets to ensure
compliance with the priorities established in the national strategy, as well as the
elimination of conflicts and unnecessary duplication among agencies. The
National Office should administer a budget certification/decertification process
with the authority to determine whether an agency's budget complies with the
national strategy and to appeal ultimately to the President to resolve disputes.
In addition to developing and overseeing the national strategy, the National
Office for Combating Terrorism should oversee terrorism-related intelligence
activities. The office should coordinate Federal programs designed to assist
response entities at the local and State levels, especially for planning, training,
exercises, and equipment. The office should provide direction and priorities for
research and development, and related test and evaluation (RDT&E) for
combating terrorism, as well as for developing nationally recognized standards
for equipment and laboratory protocols and techniques. It should coordinate
programs designed to enhance the capabilities of and coordination among the
various health and medical entities at all levels.
The National Office for Combating Terrorism should not be an operational entity
in the sense of exerting direct control over Federal assets in operations to
combat terrorism.
Finally, the director of the National Office should establish an Advisory Board for
Domestic Programs to assist in providing broad strategic guidance and to serve
as part of the approval process for the domestic portion of strategy, plans, and
programs of the National Office for Combating Terrorism. This board should be
composed of one or more sitting State governors, mayors of several U.S. cities,
the heads of several major professional organizations, and nationally recognized
subject matter experts in combating terrorism, in addition to senior
representatives of the major Federal entities that have responsibility for
combating terrorism. The President and the Congress should each appoint
members to this board.
Finding 3: The Congress shares responsibility for the inadequate
coordination of programs to combat terrorism.
The Congress's strong interest in, and commitment to, U.S. efforts to combat
terrorism is readily apparent. The Congress took the initiative in 1995 to improve
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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction
the nation's domestic preparedness against terrorism. But the Congress has
also contributed to the Executive Branch's problems. Over the past five years,
there have been a half-dozen Congressional attempts to reorganize the
Executive Branch's efforts to combat terrorism, all of which failed. None enjoyed
the support of the Executive Branch. At least 11 full committees in the Senate
and 14 full committees in the House-as well as their numerous
subcommittees-claim oversight or some responsibility for various U.S.
programs for combating terrorism. Earmarks in appropriations bills created many
of the Federal government's specific domestic preparedness programs without
authorizing legislation or oversight. The rapidly growing U.S. budget for
combating terrorism is now laced with such earmarks, which have proliferated in
the absence of an Executive Branch strategy. The Executive Branch cannot
successfully coordinate its programs for combating terrorism alone. Congress
must better organize itself and exercise much greater discipline.
Recommendation 3: The Congress should consolidate its authority over
programs for combating terrorism into a Special Committee for
Combating Terrorism-either a joint committee between the Houses or
separate committees in each House-and Congressional leadership
should instruct all other committees to respect the authority of this new
committee and to conform strictly to authorizing legislation.
The creation of a new joint committee or separate committees in each House is
necessary to improve the nation's efforts to fight terrorism. The committee
should have a substantial standing staff. The new National Office for Combating
Terrorism must establish a close working relationship with the committee, and
propose comprehensive and coherent programs and budget requests in support
of the new national strategy. The new joint or separate committee should have
the authority to dispose of the Executive Branch request and to oversee the
execution of programs that it authorizes. For this to work, other Congressional
authorizing committees with an interest in programs for combating terrorism must
recognize the concurrent, consolidated authority of the joint or separate
committee; and relevant appropriations committees must exercise restraint and
respect the authorizing legislation of the new structure. We recognize that this
task is no less daunting than the Executive Branch reorganization that we
propose above, but it is no less needed.
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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction
Finding 4: The Executive Branch and the Congress have not paid
sufficient attention to State and local capabilities for combating terrorism
and have not devoted sufficient resources to augment these capabilities
to enhance the preparedness of the nation as a whole.
The foundation of the nation's domestic preparedness for terrorism is the network
of emergency response capabilities and disaster management systems provided
by State and local governments. "Local" response personnel-community and
State law enforcement officers, firefighters, emergency medical technicians,
hospital emergency personnel, public health officials, and emergency
managers-will be the "first responders" to virtually any terrorist attack anywhere
in the nation. Federal resources may not arrive for many hours-if not days-
after the attack. A disproportionately small amount of the total funds
appropriated for combating terrorism is being allocated to provide direct or
indirect assistance to State and local response efforts. This level of Federal
funding for non-Federal capabilities is not commensurate with the importance
that State and local capabilities will have in any operational response to a major
terrorist attack inside our borders.
Any coherent national strategy for combating terrorism domestically must
recognize the critical need to build on the nation's existing emergency response
and management systems for the pragmatic reasons of viability and cost-
effectiveness.
Recommendation 4: The Executive Branch should establish a strong
institutional mechanism for ensuring the participation of high-level State
and local officials in the development and implementation of a national
strategy for terrorism preparedness.
To be consistent with the Federal structure of our government, the President
should work in closer partnership with State and local governments as they
collectively strive to achieve higher levels of domestic preparedness for terrorism.
The domestic portion of a national strategy for combating terrorism should
emphasize programs and initiatives that build appropriately on existing State and
local capabilities for other emergencies and disasters. The Executive Branch,
therefore, should develop the national strategy in close partnership with high-
level State and local officials drawn from key professional communities: elected
officials, law enforcement, fire protection, emergency medical technicians, public
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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction
health officials, hospital medical care providers, and emergency managers.
State and local officials should, in particular, have substantial responsibility for
the detailed design and oversight of the Federal training, equipment, and
exercise programs. The Advisory Board for Domestic Programs, proposed
earlier, should provide advice for these functions, augmented as necessary by
State and local representatives assigned to the National Office for Combating
Terrorism.
Finding 5: Federal programs for domestic preparedness to combat
terrorism lack clear priorities and are deficient in numerous specific
areas.
We have a number of recommendations about selected aspects of current U.S.
programs for domestic preparedness to combat terrorism. The lack of clear
priorities is an obvious byproduct of the lack of a strategy. Thus, many of our
specific recommendations reflect criticisms that are subordinate to our macro-
critique that the United States lacks a coherent national strategy. We recognize
the problem of offering detailed programmatic recommendations in advance of a
national strategy. Through its deliberations, the Advisory Panel has,
nevertheless, reached consensus on a number of specific findings and
recommendations, summarized below and detailed in the full report.
Specific Functional Recommendations.
Our focus continues to be on the needs of local and State response entities.
"Local" response entities-law enforcement, fire service, emergency medical
technicians, hospital emergency personnel, public health officials, and
emergency managers-will always be the "first response," and conceivably the
only response. When entities at various levels of government are engaged, the
responsibilities of all entities and lines of authority must be clear.
1. Collecting Intelligence, Assessing Threats, and Sharing Information. The
National Office for Combating Terrorism should foster the development of a
consolidated all-source analysis and assessment capability that would provide
various response entities as well as policymakers with continuing analysis of
potential threats and broad threat assessment input into the development of the
annual national strategy. That capability should be augmented by improved
human intelligence collection abroad, more effective domestic activities with a
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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction
thorough review of various Federal guidelines, and reasonable restrictions on
acquisition of CBRN precursors or equipment. The National Office should also
foster enhancements in measurement and signature intelligence, forensics, and
indications and warning capabilities. To promote the broadest possible
dissemination of useful, timely (and if necessary, classified) information, the
National Office should also oversee the development and implementation of a
protected, Internet-based single-source web page system, linking appropriate
sources of information and databases on combating terrorism across all relevant
functional disciplines.
2. Operational Coordination. The National Office for Combating Terrorism
should encourage Governors to designate State emergency management
entities as domestic preparedness focal points for coordination with the Federal
government. The National Office should identify and promote the establishment
of single-source, "all hazards" planning documents, standardized Incident
Command and Unified Command Systems, and other model programs for use in
the full range of emergency contingencies, including terrorism. Adherence to
these systems should become a requirement of Federal preparedness
assistance.
3. Training, Equipping, and Exercising. The National Office for Combating
Terrorism should develop and manage a comprehensive national plan for
Federal assistance to State and local agencies for training and equipment and
the conduct of exercises, including the promulgation of standards in each area.
The National Office should consult closely with State and local stakeholders in
the development of this national plan. Federal resources to support the plan
should be allocated according to the goals and objectives specified in the
national strategy, with State and local entities also providing resources to support
its implementation.
4. Health and Medical Considerations. The National Office for Combating
Terrorism should reevaluate the current U.S. approach to providing public health
and medical care in response to acts of terrorism, especially possible mass
casualty incidents and most particularly bioterrorism. The key issues are
insufficient education and training in terrorism-related subjects, minimum
capabilities in surge capacity and in treatment facilities, and clear standards and
protocols for laboratories and other activities, and vaccine programs. A robust
public health infrastructure is necessary to ensure an effective response to
terrorist attacks, especially those involving biologic agents. After consultation
with public health and medical care entities, the National Office should oversee
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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction
the establishment of financial incentives coupled with standards and certification
requirements that will, over time, encourage the health and medical sector to
build and maintain required capabilities. In addition, Federal, State, and local
governments should clarify legal and regulatory authorities for quarantine,
vaccinations, and other prescriptive measures.
5. Research and Development, and National Standards. The National Office for
Combating Terrorism should establish a clear set of priorities for research and
development for combating terrorism, including long-range programs. Priorities
for targeted research should be responder personnel protective equipment;
medical surveillance, identification, and forensics; improved sensor and rapid
readout capability; vaccines and antidotes; and communications interoperability.
The National Office must also coordinate the development of nationally
recognized standards for equipment, training, and laboratory protocols and
techniques, with the ultimate objective being official certification.
6. Providing Cyber Security Against Terrorism. Cyber attacks inside the United
States could have "mass disruptive," even if not "mass destructive" or "mass
casualty" consequences. During the coming year, the Advisory Panel will focus
on specific aspects of critical infrastructure protection (CIP), as they relate to the
potential for terrorist attacks. In our discussions thus far, we have identified
several areas for further deliberation, including CIP policy oversight; standards;
alert, warning, and response; liability and other legal issues, and CIP research.
We will make specific policy recommendations in our next report.
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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction
Chapter One
Forging a National Strategy
We have been fortunate as a nation. The terrorist incidents in this country-however
tragic-have occurred so rarely that the foundations of our society or our form of
government have not been threatened. Nevertheless, the potential for terrorist attacks
inside the borders of the United States is a serious emerging threat. There is no guarantee
that our comparatively secure domestic sanctuary will always remain so. Because the
stakes are so high, our nation's leaders must take seriously the possibility of an escalation
of terrorist violence against the homeland.
The continuing challenge for the United States is first to deter and, failing that, to detect
and interdict terrorists before they strike. Should an attack occur, local, State, and
Federal authorities must be prepared to respond and mitigate the consequences of the
attack.
To prepare to manage the consequences of such attacks effectively, the United States
needs changes in the relationships among all levels of government. Our ability to
respond cannot depend on a single level or agency of government. Rather we need a
national approach, one that recognizes the unique individual skills that communities,
States, and the Federal government possess and that, collectively, will give us the "total
package" needed to address all aspects of terrorism.
The Advisory Panel produced a comprehensive assessment, in its first report, of the
terrorist threat, with a focus on chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN)
weapons. There we said:
The Panel concludes that the Nation must be prepared for the entire spectrum
of potential terrorist threats both the unprecedented higher-consequence
attack, as well as the historically more frequent, lesser-consequence terrorist
attack, which the Panel believes is more likely in the near term. Conventional
explosives, traditionally a favorite tool of the terrorist, will likely remain the
terrorist weapon of choice in the near term as well. Whether smaller-scale
CBRN or conventional, any such lower-consequence event-at least in terms
of casualties or destruction-could, nevertheless, accomplish one or more
terrorist objectives: exhausting response capabilities, instilling fear,
undermining government credibility, or provoking an overreaction by the
1
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction
government. With that in mind, the Panel's report urges a more balanced
approach, so that not only higher-consequence scenarios will be considered,
but that increasing attention must now also be paid to the historically more
frequent, more probable, lesser-consequence attack, especially in terms of
policy implications for budget priorities or the allocation of other resources,
to optimize local response capabilities. A singular focus on preparing for an
event potentially affecting thousands or tens of thousands may result in a
smaller, but nevertheless lethal attack involving dozens failing to receive an
appropriate response in the first critical minutes and hours.
While noting that the technology currently exists that would allow terrorists
to produce one of several lethal CBRN weapons, the report also describes the
current difficulties in acquiring or developing and in maintaining, handling,
testing, transporting, and delivering a device that truly has the capability to
cause "mass casualties."1
The Panel stands by its conclusions from one year ago.
In its second year, the Advisory Panel shifted its emphasis from threat assessment to
broad program assessment. While the Advisory Panel found much to commend, it also
found problems at all levels of government and in virtually every functional discipline
relevant to combating terrorism. The Panel believes these problems are particularly acute
at high levels of the Federal Executive Branch. Hence, the present report highlights the
related issues of national strategy and Federal organization, and recommends solutions
for these and other problems.
The United States needs a functional, coherent national strategy for domestic
preparedness against terrorism. A national strategy is a high-level statement of national
objectives coupled logically to a statement of the means to be used to achieve these
objectives. In a coherent strategy, programmatic details are analytically derived from the
statement of goals. Currently, there is no overarching statement of what the United States
is trying to achieve with its program to combat terrorism . Goals must be expressed in
terms of results, not process. Government officials currently speak of terrorism
preparedness goals in terms of program execution. Administrative measurements of
program implementation are not meaningful for the purposes of strategic management
and obscure the more fundamental and important question: To what end are these
programs being implemented?
Instead of a national strategy, the nation has a loosely coupled set of plans and specific
programs that aim, individually, to achieve certain particular preparedness objectives.
Senior U.S. officials state that several official broad policy and planning documents that
have been published in recent years-Presidential Decision Directives 39 and 62, the
1 The First Annual Report to the President and the Congress: I. Assessing the Threat (the "First Report"),
p. viii. The First Report was delivered on December 15, 1999. For a complete copy of the report, see
http://www.rand.org/organization/nsrd/terrpanel/.
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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction
Attorney General's 1999 Five-Year Interagency Counterterrorism and Technology Crime
Plan, and the most recent Annual Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism2-taken
as a whole, constitute a national strategy. These documents describe plans, the
compilation of various programs already under way, and some objectives; but they do not
either individually or collectively constitute a national strategy.
Many of the current programs have resulted from specific Congressional earmarks in
various appropriations bills and did not originate in Executive Branch budget requests.
They are the initiatives of concerned and proactive Senators and Representatives.
Although Executive Branch agencies are administering programs assigned to them in the
appropriations legislation, the Executive Branch has not articulated a broad national
strategy that would synchronize the existing programs or identify future program
priorities needed to achieve national objectives for domestic preparedness for terrorism.
Given the structure of our national government, only the Executive Branch can produce
such a national strategy.
The Advisory Panel therefore recommends that the next President develop and
present to the Congress a national strategy for combating terrorism within one year
of assuming office.3 The next Administration should begin this process of developing a
national strategy by a thoughtful articulation of national goals (ends) of the program,
focusing on results rather than process. The structure and specifics of the national
program should derive logically and transparently from the goals, not the other way
around.
Basic Assumptions
The Advisory Panel agreed on several basic assumptions to guide its approach to strategy
development.
First, "local" response entities-law enforcement, fire service, emergency medical
technicians, hospital emergency personnel, public health officials, and emergency
managers, in any of several combinations depending on the nature of the attack-will
always be the "first "-and conceivably only-response. "Local" entities in this context
can include elements of incorporated and unincorporated municipalities, counties, and
State organizations. In every case, some combination of those entities will inevitably be
involved.
Second, in the event of a major terrorist attack, however defined-number of fatalities or
total casualties, the point at which local and State capabilities are overwhelmed, or some
2 The Office of Management and Budget, Annual Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism, Including
Defense against Weapons of Mass Destruction/Domestic Preparedness and Critical Infrastructure
Protection, May 18, 2000.
3 The Advisory Panel made essentially the same recommendation in its first annual report: "A national
strategy to address the issues of domestic preparedness and response to terrorist incidents involving CBRN
and other types of weapons is urgently needed." First Report, p. 54.
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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction
other measure-no single jurisdiction is likely to be capable of responding to such an
attack without outside assistance. This assumption is critical to understanding the need
for mutual aid agreements and coordinated operations.
Third-and perhaps most important-there are existing emergency response and
management capabilities, developed over many years, for responses to natural disasters,
disease outbreaks, and accidents. Those capabilities can and should be used as a base for
enhancing our domestic capability for response to a terrorist attack. We are not, as some
have asserted, "totally unprepared" for a major terrorist attack, even with a biological
weapon. We can strengthen existing capabilities, without buying duplicative, cost-
prohibitive capabilities exclusively dedicated to terrorism. Similarly, our capabilities to
deter, prevent, or respond to a terrorist attack correspondingly enhance capabilities
against attacks from nation-states.
Essential Characteristics of a Comprehensive Functional Strategy for Combating Terrorism
NATIONAL IN SCOPE, NOT JUST FEDERAL
APPROPRIATELY RESOURCED AND BASED ON MEASURABLE PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES
FOCUSED ON THE FULL RANGE OF DETERRENCE, PREVENTION, PREPAREDNESS, AND RESPONSE
ACROSS THE SPECTRUM OF THREATS-DOMESTIC AND INTERNA TIONAL
FOR DOMESTIC PROGRAMS, BUILT UPON REQUIREMENTS FROM AND FULLY COORDINATED
WITH RELEVANT LOCAL, STATE, AND FEDERAL AUTHORITIES
The national strategy should be geographically and functionally comprehensive. It
should address both international and domestic terrorism. The distinction between
terrorism outside the borders of the United States and domestic terrorist threats is
eroding. International terrorism crosses borders easily and may directly affect the
American homeland. This was evident in the New York World Trade Center bombing in
1993, and more recently in the activities around the turn of the century, especially with
the arrests of Ahmed Ressam in Washington State, and Lucia Garofalo and Bouabide
Chamchi in Vermont. The terrorist bombings of the U.S. garrison at Khobar Towers,
Saudi Arabia, the two U.S. embassies in East Africa, and the recent USS Cole incident,
also illustrate the reach of terrorists against U.S. interests and the profound domestic
implications they pose.
To be functionally comprehensive, the national strategy should address the full spectrum
of the nation's efforts against terrorism: intelligence, deterrence, prevention,
investigation, prosecution, preemption, crisis management, and consequence
management. As the Advisory Panel recognized in its first report, our nation's highest
goal must be the deterrence and prevention of terrorism. The United States cannot,
however, prevent all terrorist attacks. When deterrence and prevention fail, the nation
must respond effectively to terrorism, whether to resolve an ongoing incident, mitigate its
consequences, identify the perpetrators, and prosecute or retaliate as appropriate. The
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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction
national strategy should deal with all aspects of combating terrorism and must carefully
weigh their relative importance for the purpose of allocating resources among them.
The national strategy should apply to the nation as a whole, not just the Federal Executive
Branch. The Federal government should lead a strategic planning process that involves
States and communities as essential and equal partners.4
The national strategy must be appropriately resourced, by all levels of government, to
provide a reasonable opportunity to achieve its successful implementation. At the
Federal level, that will require a closer relationship between the Executive and
Legislative Branches. Nationally, that will require better coordination with State and
local governments.
Identifying the Ends of Strategy: National Goals
The first step in developing a coherent national strategy is for the Executive Branch to
define some meaningful, measurable expression of what it is trying to achieve in
combating terrorism. The Federal government's goals are currently expressed primarily
in terms of program execution. Administrative measurements alone do not foster
effective management of a national program.
The national strategy must express preparedness goals in terms of an "end state" toward
which the program strives. Since there exists no ready-made measurement of a country's
preparedness for terrorism, especially domestically, the Executive Branch must develop
objective measurements for its program to combat terrorism, to track its progress, to
determine priorities and appropriate funding levels, and to know when the desired "end
state" has been achieved.
The nation's strategy for combating terrorism requires results-based goals for three
reasons. First, the programs need an end-state goal. Elected and appointed officials from
Federal, State, and local governments must be able to allocate resources to specific
geographic regions according to requirements of that region. Resources should be
allocated to achieve that broadest application for all emergency and disaster needs,
consistent with preparedness goals. That approach is fundamental to the principles of
building on existing systems and to achieving the maximum possible multipurpose
capability.
Second, programs for combating terrorism need accountability. Legislators and public
officials, especially elected ones, must have some reliable, systematic way of assessing
the extent to which their efforts and taxpayers' money are producing effective results.
4 One of the most effective processes for identifying the issues most important to State and local entities
has been the joint effort of the National Governors Association (NGA) Center for Best Practices and the
National Emergency Management Association (NEMA) in conducting "States' Regional Terrorism Policy
Forums." The entire compilation of "States' Recommendations" from the NGA/NEMA Policy Forums is
contained in Appendix J. Future references in this report will be to "States' Recommendations" by
recommendation number.
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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction
The performance and results of programs for combating terrorism are currently assessed
almost solely according to anecdote. The only concrete measure available at the moment
is the dispersal of Federal funds-a process measurement that does not achieve effective
strategic management.
Third, programs for combating terrorism need clear priorities. It is impossible to set
priorities without first defining results-based objectives. The essence of any coherent
strategy is a clear statement of priorities that can be translated into specific policy and
programmatic initiatives. Priorities are the transmission mechanism that connects ends to
means.
Developing the Means of Strategy: Program Structure and Priorities
Setting priorities is essential in any strategy, but priorities require clear, results-based
objectives. With some meaningful sense of objectives, it will be possible to develop
coherent priorities and an appropriate set of policy prescriptions. For instance, should the
nation seek a different level of preparedness for large urban centers than for rural areas?
What should be the relative importance of preparing for conventional terrorism,
radiological incidents, chemical weapons, biological weapons, or cyber attacks? Should
the nation seek to improve its preparedness more against the types of attacks that are
most likely to occur, such as conventional terrorist bombings or the use of industrial
chemicals, or for those that are most damaging but less likely to occur, such as nuclear
weapons or military-grade chemical or biological weapons? With respect to biological
weapons, which pathogens deserve priority? Should the emphasis be on small-scale
contamination attacks as opposed to large-scale aerosol releases of the worst pathogen
types, such as anthrax, plague, and smallpox? What is the relative priority for allocating
resources to protect critical infrastructure, especially from cyber attacks?
The answers to these and other questions have important implications for the allocation
of Federal resources for training, equipment acquisition, exercises, research and
development, pharmaceutical stockpiles, vaccination programs, and response plans.
A coherent national strategy would provide clarity to the allocation of Federal resources
across the full range of possible activities to combat terrorism. To date, these critical
resource allocation decisions have been made in an ad hoc manner and without reference
to meaningful national goals.
The Executive Branch has not articulated a broad functional national strategy for
combating terrorism. It is, therefore, not possible for the Advisory Panel to evaluate the
extent to which the current panoply of preparedness programs contributes to the
achievement of strategic goals. The next Administration should address the issue as a top
priority, and certainly no later than one year after taking office. The country is now at a
disadvantage in that a large number of programs have already been established and may
have to be reconfigured-an inevitable consequence of their ad hoc origins.
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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction
Chapter Two
Getting the Federal House in Order
IMPROVING FEDERAL EXECUTIVE BRANCH COORDINATION
To many at the State and local levels, the structure and process at the Federal level for
combating terrorism appear uncoordinated, complex, and confusing. Our first report
included a graphical depiction of the numerous Federal agencies and offices within those
agencies that have responsibilities for combating terrorism.5 Attempts to create a Federal
focal point for coordination with State and local officials-such as the National Domestic
Preparedness Office-have met with little success. Moreover, many State and local
officials believe that Federal programs intended to assist at their levels are often created
and implemented without consulting them.6 Confusion often exists even within the
Federal bureaucracy. The current coordination structure does not possess the requisite
authority or accountability to make policy changes and to impose the discipline necessary
among the numerous Federal agencies involved.
"THE NATIONAL OFFICE FOR COMBATING TERRORISM"
We recommend the establishment of a senior level coordination entity in the
Executive Office of the President, entitled the "National Office for Combating
Terrorism," with the responsibility for developing domestic and international policy
and for coordinating the program and budget of the Federal government's activities
for combating terrorism.7
5 First Report, Appendix A.
6 The implementation of the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici "120 Cities" training program and the initial structure
of the equipment grant program are two examples.
7 Several of the concepts contained in our recommendation were included in H.R. 4210 (the "Fowler Bill"),
as it was introduced or as it passed the House of Representatives . The most obvious difference in our
recommendations and those contained in H.R. 4210 involve the scope of responsibilities of the office. H.R.
4210 was only for domestic preparedness and response; our proposal covers both domestic and
international and therefore includes specific provisions related to foreign programs and intelligence
collection.
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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction
Principal Tasks
National Strategy. The National Office for
TASKS Combating Terrorism will have several principal
ß National Strategy tasks. Foremost will be the responsibility to develop
ß Program/Budget Controls a comprehensive national strategy. That strategy
ß Intelligence must be approved by the President and updated
ß Plans Review
ß Proposals for Change annually. It must address the full range of domestic
ß Domestic Programs and international terrorism deterrence, prevention,
ß Health and Medical preparedness, and response. The approach to the
ß RDT&E and Standards
ß Clearinghouse domestic part of the strategy should be "bottom up,"
developed in close coordination with local, State, and
other Federal entities.8
The strategy must contain a detailed implementation plan, with specific milestones for its
accomplishment. Most important, the strategy must articulate a methodology for
continually measuring and monitoring domestic preparedness. That methodology must
be accomplished in close coordination with the States. Preparedness efforts will vary
from State to State and even among jurisdictions within States. Nevertheless, some
rational system to rate our preparedness as a nation will be required, if making the most
effective use of limited resources-at all levels of government-is a worthwhile goal.
We do not suggest that all jurisdictions "look the same" in terms of a specific minimum
number, for example, of pieces of certain personal protective equipment (PPE) per
thousand population.
A simple "scorecard" for preparedness is not the answer. One city in the Los Angeles
metropolitan area, for example, may not have any "Level A" chemical protective suits,
but may possess the latest state-of-the-art communications equipment. A neighboring
jurisdiction may recently have invested in "Level A" gear. Taking the best of each and of
other nearby jurisdictions as part of a cooperative effort for mutual aid will yield
dramatically different preparedness indicators than a "city-by-city" rating scheme.
Cooperative efforts among jurisdictions will foster preparedness on an area basis.
That recognition suggests to us that a preparedness measurement process should be
developed along regional lines. Such an approach might start with the 10 Federal
Emergency Management Agency regions as a base with further subdivisions into area
groupings.
Program and Budget Controls. A concurrent responsibility of the National Office for
Combating Terrorism will be to work within the Executive Branch and with the Congress
to ensure that sufficient resources are allocated to support the execution of the national
strategy. The U.S. strategy for deterrence, prevention, preparedness, and response for
terrorists acts outside the United States, developed under the leadership of the
8 See "States' Recommendations," Nos. 11 and 23, Appendix J.
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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction
Department of State, is comprehensive and, for the most part, appropriately resourced. It
is on the domestic front that much additional effort and coordination will be required.
We recommend that the National Office for Combating Terrorism be given the
authority to exercise specific limited program and budget control over activities for
combating terrorism within the relevant Federal departments and agencies. That
authority should include the responsibility to conduct a full review of Federal agency
programs and budgets, to ensure compliance with the programmatic and funding
priorities established in the approved national strategy and to eliminate conflicts and
unnecessary duplication among agencies. We recommend that an Assistant Director
direct the program and budget functions for Management and Budget.
The Office of Management and Budget and the responsible element of the National
Security Council staff-the Office of the National Coordinator for Security, Counter-
terrorism, and Infrastructure Protection-have developed a process for submitting a
composite "roll-up" of the programs for combating terrorism of the various Federal
agencies. The latest submission to the Congress9 is the most comprehensive to date.
That is an important step in the right direction-a macro-level inventory of agency
spending to combat terrorism. To be truly effective, however, such a process must
contain specific authority to hold agencies accountable for their spending and for
compliance with the national strategy. Moreover, OMB's "Annual Report" provides only
general program descriptions. The Executive should provide comprehensive information
to the Congress to consider in the deliberative authorization and appropriations processes.
In addition to a comprehensive strategy document, supporting budget information should
include a complete description and justification for each program, coupled with current
and proposed out-year expenditures.
Intelligence Coordination and Analysis. We recommend that the National Office for
Combating Terrorism provide coordination and advocacy for both foreign and
domestic terrorism-related intelligence activities, including the development of
national net assessments of terrorist threats. A critical task will be to develop, in
concert with the Intelligence Community,10 policies and plans for the dissemination of
intelligence and other pertinent information on terrorist threats to designated entities at all
levels of government-local, State, and Federal.11
We recommend that an Assistant Director for Intelligence in the National Office
direct the intelligence function for Combating Terrorism, who should be "dual-
hatted" as the National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for Combating Terrorism at the
9 Annual Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism, Including Defense against Weapons of Mass
Destruction/ Domestic Preparedness and Critical Infrastructure Protection, May 18, 2000. The
requirement for the submission to the Congress of an annual report of funding efforts in the Executive
Branch to combat terrorism is contained in Section 1051 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1998 (Pub. L. 10585), as amended by Section 1403 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1999 (Pub. L. 105261).
10 Including its Federal law enforcement components.
11 For more detailed recommendations in this subject area, see the section entitled "Collecting Intelligence,
Assessing Threats, and Sharing Information" in Chapter Three.
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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction
National Intelligence Council. That Assistant Director/NIO and staff would be
responsible for compiling terrorism intelligence products from the various agencies, for
providing national-level threat assessments for inclusion in the national strategy, and for
producing composite or "fused" products for dissemination to designated Federal, State,
and local entities, as appropriate. The Assistant Director/NIO should be delegated, by
Executive Order or in enabling legislation, tasking authority for terrorism-related
intelligence collection and analysis. That person will serve as focal point for developing
policy for combating terrorism intelligence matters, keeping the policymaking and
operational aspects of intelligence collection and analysis separate. The Assistant
Director will also be the logical interface with the intelligence oversight committees of
the Congress. It is, in our view, important to have a senior-level position created for this
purpose, and we recommend that the person initially chosen to fill the position be a
current or former agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. That position can then be
filled in rotation by appropriately qualified persons from law enforcement and the
Intelligence Community. The intelligence office should be staffed with a small, select
staff of knowledgeable and experienced personnel, who understand collection, analysis,
and assessment processes, from the various intelligence and law enforcement agencies.
There is sound rationale for the legal and regulatory requirements governing the
"domestic collection" of intelligence by the Intelligence Community.12 It will be the
responsibility of the Assistant Director for Intelligence and the intelligence staff to ensure
strict adherence to applicable law and regulations in the administration of these activities.
To assist in this intelligence function, we recommend the establishment of a "Council
to Coordinate Intelligence for Combating Terrorism," to provide strategic direction
for intelligence collection and analysis, as well as a clearance mechanism for product
dissemination and other related activities. It should consist of the heads of the various
Intelligence Community entities and State and local representatives who have been
granted appropriate security clearance. The Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and the Director of Central Intelligence should chair it in annual rotation.
Plans Review. We recommend that the National Office for Combating Terrorism
be given authority to review State and geographical area strategic plans, and at the
request of State entities, review local plans or programs for combating terrorism,
for consistency with the national strategy. That review will allow the National Office
to identify gaps and deficiencies in Federal programs. At the completion of that review,
the National Office should provide an analysis of the plan or program, including any
recommendations for modification, to the submitting jurisdiction.
Proposals for Change. We recommend that the National Office for Combating
Terrorism have authority to propose new Federal programs or changes to existing
programs, including Federal statutory or regulatory authority.
12 For further discussion on this point, see the section entitled "Collecting Intelligence, Assessing Threats,
and Sharing Information" in Chapter Three.
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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction
Domestic Preparedness Programs. We recommend an Assistant Director for
Domestic Preparedness Programs in the National Office to direct the coordination
of Federal programs designed to assist response entities at the local and State levels,
especially in the areas of "crisis" and "consequence" planning, training, exercises,
and equipment programs for combating terrorism.13 The national strategy that the
National Office should develop-in coordination with State and local stakeholders-
must provide strategic direction and priorities for programs and activities in each of these
areas.
Health and Medical Programs. Much remains to be done in the coordination and
enhancement of Federal health and medical programs for combating terrorism and for
coordination among public health officials, public and private hospitals, pre-hospital
emergency medical service (EMS) entities, and the emergency management
communities. We recommend that the responsibility for coordinating programs to
address health and medical issues be vested in an Assistant Director for Health and
Medical Programs in the National Office for Combating Terrorism. The national
strategy should provide direction for the establishment of national education programs for
the health and medical disciplines, for the development of national standards for health
and medical response to terrorism, and for clarifying various legal and regulatory
authority for health and medical response.
Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E), and National Standards.
We recommend that the responsibility for coordinating programs in these two areas
be assigned to an Assistant Director for Research, Development, Test, and
Evaluation, and National Standards in the National Office for Combating
Terrorism.14 The national strategy should provide direction and priorities for RDT&E
for combating terrorism. We believe that the Federal government has primary
responsibility for combating terrorism RDT&E. Local jurisdictions and most states will
not have the resources to engage in the research and development required in the
sophisticated environment that may be a part of the nation's response to terrorism.
Moreover, we have essentially no nationally recognized standards in such areas as
personal protective equipment, detection equipment, and laboratory protocols and
techniques.
Clearinghouse Function. We recommend that the National Office for Combating
Terrorism should serve as the information clearinghouse and central Federal point
of contact for State and local entities. We heard many comments about how difficult it
is for local jurisdictions and State agencies, even those with experience in complex
Federal programs, to navigate the maze of the Federal structure. The National Office for
Combating Terrorism should assume that role and serve as the "one-stop shop" for
13 For more detailed recommendations in this subject area, see the sections entitled "Training, Equipping,
and Exercising" and "Planning, Coordinating, and Operating Cooperatively" in Chapter Three.
14 For more detailed recommendations on RDT&E, see the section entitled "Promoting Better Research and
Development, and Developing National Standards" in Chapter Three.
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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction
providing advice and assistance on Federal programs for training, planning, exercises,
equipment, reporting, and other information of value to local and State entities.
Structure and Characteristics
ATTRIBUTES
The National Office for Combating Terrorism
ß Political Accountability
ß Program/Budget Authority should possess certain essential attributes, as
ß Multidisciplinary Staffing follows:
ß No Operational Control
ß Advisory Board Political Accountability and Responsibility.
ß Relationships The person designated as the focal point for
developing a national strategy and for
coordinating Federal programs for combating terrorism must have political accountability
and responsibility. That person should be vested with sufficient authority to accomplish
the purposes for which the office is created and should be the senior point of contact of
the Executive Branch with the Congress. In that way, the Congress will have the
opportunity to discuss the government's overall policy and programs for combating
terrorism with the senior official responsible. For these reasons, we recommend that
the President appoint and the Senate confirm the Director of the National Office for
Combating Terrorism, who should serve in a "cabinet-level" position.
Program and Budget Authority. The National Office for Combating Terrorism should
have sufficient budget authority and programmatic oversight to influence the resource
allocation process and ensure program compatibility. That process should include a
structured certification/decertification process to formally "decertify" all or part of an
agency's budget as noncompliant with the national strategy. A decertification would
require the agency to revise its budget to make it compliant or, alternatively, to allow the
agency head to appeal the decertification decision to the President. This recommendation
does not give the Director of the National Office authority to "veto" all or part of any
agency's budget, or the authority to redirect funds within an agency or among agencies
Multidisciplinary Staffing. We recommend that the National Office for Combating
Terrorism have full-time multidisciplinary expertise, with representation from each
of the Federal agencies with responsibilities for combating terrorism, and with
resident State and local expertise. The National Office can ensure Federal agency
representation by directly hiring personnel from the various agencies. A better approach
would be the directed detail of various Federal agency personnel on a term basis. That
would allow for the rotation of incoming personnel who bring current perspectives from
their respective agencies and the return to those agencies of personnel who will have a
national-level perspective. Moreover, the personnel and the agencies involved must view
such assignments as "career enhancing."
For programs with a domestic focus, the National Office for Combating Terrorism must
have sufficient resources to employ persons with State and local expertise and from each
of the response disciplines. The National Office should enter into agreement with State
and local jurisdictions for a leave of absence for certain personnel, to be employed by the
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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction
National Office for a specified term. With that approach, there would be a constant flow
of personnel with perspectives "fresh from the street."
No Operational Control. While the National Office for Combating Terrorism should be
vested with specific program coordination and budget authority, it is not our intention
that it have "operational" control over various Federal agency activities.
We recommend that the National Office for Combating Terrorism not be "in
charge" of response operations in the event of a terrorist attack. The National Office
should provide a coordinating function and disseminate intelligence and other critical
information. The word "czar" is inappropriate to describe this office. The Director
should not be empowered to order any Federal agency to undertake any specific activity.
Lead Federal Agency responsibility will normally fall to the Department of Justice for
"crisis management" and to the Federal Emergency Management Agency for
"consequence management." Other than its continuing responsibility in facilitating the
flow of information and intelligence, this recommendation does not envision any
operational role for the National Office for Combating Terrorism during an actual
response.
"Lead Federal Agency" and "Lead Agency" are defined as follows:
"2. Several of these plans designate a Lead Federal Agency (LFA) to coordinate the
Federal response. The LFA is determined by the type of emergency. In general, an
LFA establishes operational structures and procedures to assemble and work with
agencies providing direct support to the LFA in order to obtain an initial assessment of
the situation, develop an action plan, and monitor and update operational priorities.
The LFA ensures that each agency exercises its concurrent and distinct authorities
and supports the LFA in carrying out relevant policy. Specific responsibilities of an
LFA vary according to the agency's unique statutory authorities."15
. . . . . .
"G. Lead Agency. The FBI defines lead agency, as used in PDD-39, as the Federal
department or agency assigned lead responsibility to manage and coordinate a
specific function-either crisis management or consequence management. Lead
agencies are designated on the basis of their having the most authorities, resources,
capabilities, or expertise relative to accomplishment of the specific function. Lead
agencies support the overall Lead Federal Agency during all phases of the terrorism
response."16
With few exceptions, we recommend that existing programs remain in the agencies in
which they currently reside. One notable exception will be the functions of the National
Domestic Preparedness Office (NDPO), currently housed in the Federal Bureau of
Investigation. The new office should subsume all of the intended functions of the
15 Federal Response Plan, Basic Plan, Chapter IV. Concept of Operations, Section B, Concurrent
Implementation of Other Federal Emergency Plans, paragraph 2.
16 Federal Response Plan, Terrorism Incident Annex, Section VIII, Terms and Definitions, paragraph G.
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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction
NDPO-coordination, information clearinghouse, advice and assistance to State and
local entities.
The National Office for Combating Terrorism should also assume many of the
interagency coordination functions currently managed by the National Security Council
office of the National Coordinator for Security, Counter-terrorism, and Infrastructure
Protection. For example, the responsibility for coordination of certain functions related
to combating terrorism-Assistance to State and Local Authorities, Research and
Development, Contingency Planning and Exercises, and Legislative and Legal Issues,
among others-will devolve to the National Office for Combating Terrorism.17 We also
recommend that the National Office for Combating Terrorism absorb certain entities as
adjuncts to its office, such as the Interagency Board for Equipment Standardization and
InterOperability.
Advisory Board for Domestic Programs. To assist in providing broad strategic
guidance and to serve as part of the approval process for the domestic portion of
strategy, plans, and programs of the National Office for Combating Terrorism, we
recommend the establishment of a national "Advisory Board for Domestic
Programs." That Board should include one or more sitting State governors, mayors of
several U.S. cities, the heads of several major professional organizations,18 and a few
nationally recognized terrorism subject matter experts, as well as senior officials from
relevant Federal agencies. The President and the Congress should each appoint members
to this board.
Intelligence Director Advisory Board for
Coordinating Council Domestic Programs
Assistant Director Assistant Director Assistant Director Assistant Director Assistant Director
for Management for for Domestic for Health and for RDT&E and
And Budget Intelligence Programs Medical Programs Standards
- Program/ - Coordination/ - Planning - Education/Training - Short/long
Budget Review Advocacy - Training - Certifications range R&D
- Certification/ - Net Assessments - Exercises - Standards/ - National
Decertification - Dual-hatted NIO - Equipment Protocols Standards
- Budget submission - Authorities
Figure 1. National Office for Combating Terrorism
17 To avoid confusion, we recommend the removal of the "counter-terrorism" element of the
"coordinator's" title. The "coordinator" will continue to be Special Assistant to the President and Senior
Director for Transnational Threats. That office should coordinate with the new National Office on
terrorism issues.
18 Potential organizations would include the International Association of Chiefs of Police, the International
Association of Fire Fighters, the International Association of Fire Chiefs, the National Association of
Emergency Medical Technicians, the National Emergency Management Association, the Council of State
and Territorial Epidemiologists, the National League of Cities, the National Association of Counties, and
the International City/County Management Association.
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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction
Relationship with Other Federal Entities and Agencies. The nature of the relationship
of the National Office for Combating Terrorism with other Federal entities and the lines
of authority for all involved must be clear.
National Security Council (NSC)-The Director of the National Office for
Combating Terrorism should attend meetings of the National Security Council
when terrorism is a topic for consideration. Appropriate elements of the National
Security Council structure will provide direct input into the national strategy
development and program and budget activities for combating terrorism for
national security issues.19
Office of Management and Budget (OMB)-The program and authorities of the
National Office for Combating Terrorism are not intended to supplant or usurp the
authorities of OMB. Agencies with responsibilities for combating terrorism will
continue to submit complete budgets, including those parts of the budget related
to programs for combating terrorism, to OMB. In parallel, the portions of agency
budgets related to programs for combating terrorism will also be submitted to the
National Office for Combating Terrorism.
Federal Cabinet Departments and Other Federal Agencies-"Lead Federal
Agency" and "Lead Agency" designations and roles related to Federal programs
and activities for combating terrorism will continue to apply.
Alternative Structures Considered
During the course of our deliberations on the issue of improving Federal Executive
Branch coordination, we considered and rejected other alternatives to the creation of an
entity in the Executive Office of the President. We set forth those various alternatives in
Appendix E and explain why each was rejected.
19 An analogy is the current relationship between the National Security Council staff and the Office of
National Drug Control Policy. The director of that office likewise attends NSC meetings pertaining to drug
control matters. There are other similarities as well. The current statutory provisions for the structure and
authority of the Office of National Drug Control Policy are contained in 21 U.S. Code, Chapter 22 (22 U.S.
Code, Sections 17011712).
15
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction
IMPROVING COORDINATION IN THE CONGRESS
In our first report, we were critical of the Congress for its propensity to make "decisions
for authority and funding to address domestic preparedness and response issues [for
combating terrorism] with little or no coordination." We noted that the "various
committees of the Congress continue to provide authority and money within the confines
of each committee's jurisdiction over one or a limited number of Federal agencies and
programs."20 Those observations still pertain.
The Congress has been active in proposing legislative "fixes" to the problem of
Interagency coordination. Two recent examples are the unanimous passage by the House
of Representatives of a bill to create the "Office of Terrorism Preparedness" in the
Executive Office of the President,21 and of a provision to create a new "Deputy Attorney
General for Combating Domestic Terrorism."22 Numerous Congressional panels on both
sides of Capitol Hill have held hearings on the subject of terrorism. The Congress has
also commissioned various studies and reports on combating terrorism by the General
Accounting Office (GAO).23 One Act noted that Members "continue to be concerned
about the threat of domestic terrorism, particularly involving the use of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) and the ability of the Federal Government to counter this threat." As
a consequence, the Congress directed a comprehensive report from the GAO:
The conferees agree to a provision that would require the Comptroller
General to provide an updated report to Congress, not later than 180
days after enactment of this Act, on federal strategy, policy and
programs to combat domestic terrorism. The conferees direct the
Comptroller General to include in the report on combating domestic
terrorism a discussion of the following issues: lead agency responsibility
for crisis and consequence management; adequacy of existing plans
formulated by the various federal agencies; threat and risk assessments;
command and control structures; exercises, including a thorough
assessment of the recent Top Official Exercise 2000; cyberterrorism; and
research and development efforts of new technologies.24
20 First Report, Chapter IV, Conclusions and Recommendations, section on Congressional Responsibilities,
p. 57.
21 H.R. 4210 passed on voice vote under suspension of the rules of the U.S. House Representatives on July
25, 2000. The bill was transmitted to the Senate and referred to the Committee on Environment and Public
Works, where no further action has been scheduled.
22 Contained in the U.S. Senate version of the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary,
and Related Agencies Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (H.R. 4690). The provision was not
contained in the version that emerged from the conference between the House and Senate. H. Rept. 106
1005. That version, which has now passed both houses, is awaiting Presidential signature or a threatened
veto for other reasons.
23 The GAO combating terrorism reports may be accessed at: http://www.gao.gov
24 Section 1035, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (NDAA FY01)(H.R. 4205, Pub.
L. 106398). See discussion in Conference Report to accompany NDAA FY01, p. 849.
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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction
The Congress continues to direct the creation and funding of specific programs with little
coordination among the various committees. Some programs are funded with little
apparent consideration for the impact of those decisions on a comprehensive national
effort.
Moreover, appropriations committees, through their various agency appropriations bills,
occasionally create and fund programs that were not subject to the normal authorization
processes. The result of such action is often lack of detail and clarity in the structure and
execution of programs, as well as a lack of continuity and sustainability, as most such
programs are only funded year by year. Examples of major programs created and funded
in appropriations bills, which have no parallel authorizing language, include most of the
programs for combating terrorism administered by the Office of State and Local
Domestic Preparedness Support in the Department of Justice: equipment grant programs
totaling $75 million; and training programs, including grants to the national training
consortium25 and the Center for Domestic Preparedness totaling $37 million; and
earmarks to two institutes totaling $30 million.26
The Congress may, however, be foundering on the issue in large measure because of the
absence of a comprehensive "national strategy" for combating terrorism. We do not
suggest that Congress has or should have the responsibility for creating such a national
strategy. That is, in our view, clearly the responsibility of the Executive Branch.
Special Committee for Combating Terrorism
We recommend the establishment of a Special Committee for Combating
Terrorism-either a joint committee between the Houses or separate committees in
each House27-to address authority and funding, and to provide Congressional
oversight, for Federal programs and authority for combating terrorism.
We do not make this proposal lightly, and do so with the full recognition that such
change may be difficult but is no less meritorious.
Committee Functions and Structure
The joint or separate committee of each House should consist of bipartisan representation
from Members of all relevant authorization, oversight, budget, and appropriations
committees and subcommittees that currently have cognizance over Federal programs
and activities to combat terrorism. It should have a full-time staff either detailed from
25 New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology; Texas A&M; Nevada Test Site (NTS); and Louisiana
State University.
26 For FY 2000 programs. Funds for FY 2001 programs will likely be higher.
27 Similar to the processes of permanent select committees on intelligence-the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction
those relevant committees and subcommittees or new employees who have the requisite
experience and expertise.28
The joint or separate panel should perform several critical functions. First, it would
constitute a forum for reviewing all aspects of a national strategy and supporting
implementation plans for combating terrorism, developed and submitted by the National
Office for Combating Terrorism. As part of that process, the joint or each separate
committee should develop a consolidated legislative plan, including authorizing language
and corresponding budget and appropriations "benchmarks" in response to the national
strategy to combat terrorism and accompanying program and budget proposals.
Second, it would serve as the "clearinghouse" for all legislative proposals for combating
terrorism. For separate bills (unrelated to the omnibus package related to the strategy),
the committee should have first referral of such legislation, prior to the referral to the
appropriate standing committee.
Such a structure, with the direct testimony from Executive Branch representatives, State
and local officials, private industry, and terrorism experts, could help to eliminate
duplication in programs and funding, and to promote an effective national program.
28 The "relevant committees and subcommittees" would include as a minimum:
Agriculture Committee (House and Senate)
Appropriations Committee (House and Senate)
Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, and the Judiciary
Subcommittee on Defense
Subcommittee on Transportation
Subcommittee on Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government
Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education
Subcommittee on Foreign Operations
Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development
Subcommittee on Agriculture and Rural Development
Armed Services Committee (House and Senate)
Budget Committee (House and Senate)
Commerce Committee (House and Senate)
Energy And Natural Resources Committee (Senate)
Resources Committee (House)
Foreign Relations Committee (Senate)
International Relations Committee (House)
Governmental Affairs Committee (Senate)
Government Reform Committee (House)
Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee (Senate)
Science Committee (House)
Judiciary Committee (House and Senate)
Transportation and Infrastructure Committee (House)
Ways and Means Committee (House)
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction
Chapter Three
Improving Functional Capabilities
In Chapter Two, we addressed improving coordination within the Executive Branch and
the Congress. We now turn to improving selected functional capabilities. Our focus, in
keeping with our Congressional mandate, continues to be on the needs of local and State
response entities. We assess how well the Federal government is doing in those areas and
recommend specific priorities for focus and allocation of resources.
Building on existing emergency and disaster response capabilities, structures, and
systems is the foundation of our approach. The nation has developed a reasonably
effective system for responses to natural disasters, naturally occurring disease outbreaks,
accidents, and for most criminal acts. It is not necessary, in our view, to create a
completely separate set of capabilities for combating terrorism. Moreover, we based our
recommendations on the premise that pursuing capabilities that have at least dual-purpose
applications is the better approach.
The National Office for Combating Terrorism, described in Chapter Two, will play the
key role in planning and synchronizing these initiatives.
COLLECTING INTELLIGENCE, ASSESSING THREATS, AND SHARING INFORMATION
From the inception of our deliberations, we have said that "more can and must be done to
provide timely information-up, down, and laterally, at all levels of government-to
those who need the information to provide effective deterrence, interdiction, protection,
or response to potential threats."29
The potential connection between terrorism originating outside the United States and
terrorist acts perpetrated inside the United States, means that "foreign" terrorism and
"domestic" terrorism may not be easily distinguished. The need for lawful, timely
collection and analysis of intelligence on foreign terrorist plots, outside or inside our
borders, is accordingly one of the most critical functional capabilities needed by this
nation. Moreover, any improvement in our ability to detect terrorist activity will provide
added capability in detecting similar activities by adversarial nation-states.
29 First Report, p. 57.
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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction
Based on classified briefings as well as "open-source" information, it is clear that the
U.S. Intelligence Community's foreign intelligence collection and analysis against
terrorism has been excellent. There is, however, room for improvement.
Improve Human Intelligence (HUMINT)
Recent events worldwide emphasize the need for the best possible intelligence.
Moreover, reliance on sophisticated "National Technical Means" or other high-
technology systems is not always sufficient to provide the necessary and timely
"indication and warning" to forestall or to defend against a terrorist attack.
Certain procedures, well intentioned when implemented, are now hampering the nation's
ability to collect the most useful intelligence. For that reason, we agree with the
conclusion of a parallel commission-the National Commission on Terrorism30-and
recommend the rescission of that portion of the 1995 guidelines, promulgated by the
Director of Central Intelligence, which prohibits the engagement of certain foreign
intelligence informants who may have previously been involved in human rights
violations. We should return to the restrictions in place prior to the 1995 guidelines,
which afforded sufficient protections, oversight, and an approval mechanism that will
prevent abuse.
Improve Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT)31
As the potential grows for terrorists to use more unconventional and sophisticated
weapons, especially with chemical or biological agents, our capability to detect such
agents assumes greater urgency and requires new technology to provide needed
capability.
To meet that challenge, we recommend an expansion and improvement in research,
development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) of reliable sensors and rapid readout
capability, and the subsequent fielding of a new generation of MASINT technology
based on enhanced RDT&E efforts. Our goal for sensors and rapid readout technology
for chemical and biological agents should be no less than our current capability for
nuclear and radiological agents.
Review Statutory and Regulatory Authorities
The following observations and recommendations do not diminish those rights and
liberties but are intended to allow the nation to be more effective in combating terrorism
while fully protecting those rights and liberties.
30 Report of the National Commission on Terrorism, Countering the Changing Threat of International
Terrorism, p. 8.
31 This recommendation is directed to national technical means, not capabilities for response entities.
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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction
We recommend a thorough review, by a panel of Department of Justice (DOJ) officials
and knowledgeable citizens outside the Federal government, of the terrorism portion of
the Attorney General's "Domestic Guidelines." We examined the guidelines, which
establish conditions under which an FBI agent can open an inquiry into possible terrorist
activity inside the United States. The guidelines appear to us to be adequate in scope but
have been rendered confusing and ambiguous by successive redrafting over the years,
leading to misunderstanding and uneven application among law enforcement agents. We
do not suggest that the guidelines be rescinded or that the underlying requirement for
them is not sound. We recommend that the panel review the domestic guidelines for
clarity, in the interests of strengthening them, while providing for the protection of
civil rights and liberties. We also recommend that the guidelines provide examples of
permissible and impermissible activity as further information for agents' decisions.
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) governs domestic national security
investigations.32 The procedures of the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR)
in the Department of Justice, required to present a matter to the special Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court established under FISA, require far more justification
than the Act does. We recommend that the Attorney General direct OIPR to modify
its procedures to conform to the FISA statutory requirements.
Moreover, controls inside our borders that can hamper efforts of potential terrorists-be
they foreign or domestic-by denying them their "tools of the trade," can be established
or strengthened without additional authority. We recommend that the Department of
Justice, in consultation with appropriate committees of the Congress as well as
knowledgeable members of the scientific, health, and medical communities, and
State and local government, continually review existing statutory authorities and
regulations. The purpose would be to propose specific prohibitions, or at least
mandatory reporting procedures, on the domestic sale and purchase of precursors
and special equipment that pose a direct, significant risk of being used to make and
deliver CBRN weapons or agents.33
Improve Forensics Capabilities to Identify Terrorist Unconventional Weapons
We have today effective forensic capabilities to detect and identify conventional
weapons, including high-explosive devices and associated mechanisms, as well as
sophisticated techniques for identifying perpetrators.34
Given the potential for terrorists to resort to chemical and biological weapons, developing
a comparable forensics capability for such weapons is a clear priority. We recommend
that the National Office for Combating Terrorism foster research and development
in forensics technology and analysis. Those steps will involve either the development
32 50 U.S. Code, Sections 18011863.
33 An identification of such precursors and equipment should be made in an Executive Order or regulations,
coordinated with all relevant Federal health and law enforcement agencies.
34 The FBI's internal laboratory and others available to it collectively are, without question, the best in the
world.
21
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction
of a new program in a specific agency, or the consolidation of several existing programs.
We also recommend that the National Office implement an Indications and
Warning System for the rapid dissemination of information developed by enhanced
forensics.
These efforts should include Federal assistance to State and local forensics capabilities.
Some terrorist threats or actual attacks may initially appear to be some other form of
criminal conduct, and Federal involvement may not be implicated. Enhancements at
State and local agencies will not only facilitate early identification, but will also support
subsequent criminal investigations.
If terrorists know that the nation has the capability to detect and identify devices and
perpetrators-so that the "return address" can be determined-deterrence is enhanced
accordingly.
Expand Information Sharing and Improve Threat Assessments
Several agencies have made strides in enhancing information sharing. Notable examples
include efforts by the FBI to implement fully its Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF)
program and to provide information on combating terrorism to response entities through
its web-based system, Law Enforcement Online ("LEO").
An even more comprehensive dissemination system must be developed to provide
information through expanded law enforcement channels, and through regional FEMA
offices into State emergency management channels, for further dissemination to local
response entities. As part of that process, the National Office should promote a
system for providing some form of security clearance to selected State and Local
officials nationwide, and methods for disseminating classified information to those
officials in near real time. One product of that process will be timely threat
assessments, in which the FBI must be an integral part. The FBI has undergone a
reorganization that consolidated several related entities into a new Counterterrorism
Division, with an Assistant Director at its head. That division needs more internal
analytic capability. We recommend that the FBI consider implementing a "Reports
Officer" or similar system, analogous to the process used by the Central Intelligence
Agency, for tracking and analyzing terrorism indicators and warnings.
To promote the broadest dissemination of information to the largest audience of response
entities, we recommend that the National Office for Combating Terrorism foster the
development of a protected, Internet-based, single-source web page system, linking
appropriate combating terrorism information and databases across all applicable
functional disciplines. The FBI's LEO system is one example of many single-function
capabilities that should be part of an integrated system. The Department of Defense is
also developing related capabilities that would be valuable components of such a system.
The system will entail a multi-agency intergovernmental and private sector cooperative
arrangement.
22
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction
PLANNING, COORDINATING, AND OPERATING COOPERATIVELY
For all of the advantages of our "federal" system of government, coordination among its
levels for major undertakings presents challenges beyond those inherent in the
undertaking itself.35
Prior to an attack, the Federal government must provide national leadership, guidance,
and assistance to response entities at all levels. Federal entities can facilitate nationwide
preparedness by helping to develop national standards for training, exercising, and
equipment programs. The Federal role is preeminent, perhaps exclusive, in the areas of
research, development, test, and evaluation. Moreover, the Federal government must
have the lead in collecting and analyzing intelligence and in fostering sharing intelligence
and information.
When a terrorist attack occurs, the Federal role for criminal investigation and prosecution
is already very specific. The FBI has responsibility for investigations of terrorist threats
and attacks. The U.S. Department of Justice then has responsibility for prosecution under
various Federal criminal statutes on terrorism. Terrorist threats or attacks may also be
violations of State or local law, so jurisdiction over investigations and prosecutions can
be concurrent. State and local officials recognize that the FBI and DOJ have paramount
though not exclusive jurisdiction in both terrorism investigation and prosecution.
Otherwise, the Federal role in a response to an actual attack should be to assist when
requested and to meet response requirements that exceed local and State capabilities.
Response to an attack must be layered and sequential: Local entities will respond first,
supplemented as necessary by State capabilities. When local capabilities are exceeded,
the response shifts to the State (perhaps multi-state) level. The Federal response should
come only after local and State capabilities are exceeded. The Federal response should
not be a major one-with the Federal entities "in the lead" for operations-except in the
most extreme situation. For such cases, detailed planning and close coordination will
lessen the prospect for overreaction that could infringe civil liberties. Moreover, relying
on assets at the Federal level that are many hours-perhaps days-from deployment in an
actual response is problematic.
We recommend that the senior emergency management entity in each State function
as the prime Focal Point for that State for domestic preparedness for terrorism.
The focal point should solicit input and representation from local jurisdictions and
agencies. The State emergency management entity should oversee the lines of
communications between the Federal government and local response entities. State
entities are more likely to have the total picture of preparedness and requirements
throughout the State and can better establish priorities for the allocation of resources and
for other requirements. This arrangement will reduce potentially counterproductive
direct communication between the Federal government and local jurisdictions.
35 For comparison purposes, support staff conducted a case study of the way the nation of Israel is
organized for and coordinates responses to terrorism. That case study is set forth in Appendix F.
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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction
Improve Collective Planning Among Federal, State, and Local Entities
Many Federal entities plan for a variety of emergency responses, including terrorism.
The Federal Response Plan (FRP)36 is intended to be the single source for "all-hazards"
responses but does not necessarily contain all plans for terrorism. The bifurcation
between "crisis" and "consequence" management further complicates the problem.37
State and local entities find it difficult to keep track of all the plans, and are often not
consulted in the plan development process.
We recommend that the Federal Response Plan (FRP) be the single source Federal
document for "all-hazards" response planning.38 All applicable Federal
departments and agencies should include their plans to respond to terrorist attacks
as annexes to the FRP, in accordance with a specific FRP template. The FRP and
the relevant Federal agency plans should include input from State and local entities.
For clarity, we recommend renaming the FRP the "Federal Support Plan."
Several States have developed excellent plans and processes for combating terrorism.39
Any of these would serve as a useful model for other States. Because States may have to
assist each other in response to a terrorist attack, coordination would obviously be
enhanced if State plans followed a standard format. We recommend that the National
Emergency Management Association, in conjunction with the Federal Emergency
Management Agency, develop a "model" State plan, flexible enough to fit any
State's specific circumstances, but with certain standard features.40 In this regard,
the National Office for Combating Terrorism should play a lead role.
Enhance Coordination of Programs and Activities
The complexities of the Federal structure for combating terrorism create daunting
challenges for a State entity, e.g., to know whom to call at the Federal level for
36 The Federal Response Plan (FRP) "establishes a process and structure for the systematic, coordinated,
and effective delivery of Federal assistance to address the consequences of any major disaster or emergency
declared under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as amended (42
U.S.C. 5121, et seq.)." FRP, Chapter 1, Introduction. Our recommendation would expand its scope to
include responses to terrorism under the Stafford Act and other Federal authority.
37 For example, the FBI's "U.S. Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Contingency Plan "
(CONPLAN) is not designed to be part of the FRP. The FBI is in the final stages of publishing the
CONPLAN, its operational plan for "crisis management," separate from the FRP, despite the fact that it
says that it was "developed consistent with . . . the Federal Response Plan and its Terrorism Incident
Annex," among other documents and directives. CONPLAN, p. iii. It should be included as a part of a
total plan. And see "States' Recommendations," Nos. 7, 11, and 19, Appendix J.
38 We considered recommending that the National Office promulgate a "Federal Terrorism Response Plan"
for Combating Terrorism. We did not favorably consider that approach for two reasons: (1) The response
plan should be operationally oriented, and the National Office for Combating Terrorism is not an
operational entity; and (2) A fundamental principle in our approach is building on existing emergency
response systems. Creating an entirely separate plan for response to terrorism could result in
ineffectiveness and potentially conflicting plans. By the same token, the FRP should not be a strategic
policy document, and the National Office should therefore, formulate policy for combating terrorism.
39 California, Iowa, New Hampshire, and New Mexico, to mention a few.
40 See "States' Recommendations," No. 15, Appendix J.
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Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction
assistance. The National Office should foster clear lines of coordination must be
established, vertically and horizontally across disciplines, and promote "best practices" to
eliminate unnecessary redundancies. Creating the National Office for Combating
Terrorism and designating State emergency management entities as the "focal point" for
State and local coordination will help. Each Federal agency should also designate a
"single point of contact" for State and local entities to obtain assistance from that Federal
agency.41
While well intended, the Federal government has in some cases created new programs to
assist State and local response entities, such as training and exercises, without a full
understanding of similar programs that already exist and that could be leveraged more
effectively with resources already available.42 We recommend that the National Office
for Combating Terrorism conduct inventories of State and local programs for
capabilities that can be utilized in a national context, especially training and exercise
programs.43
We recommend that the National Office for Combating Terrorism promote multi-
jurisdictional mutual assistance compacts, using the FBI Joint Terrorism Task
Forces as one model, and facilitate the implementation of interstate mutual
assistance compacts among states, through FEMA Regional Offices.44 Such
compacts should encompass Federal, State, and local public health entities in all aspects
of planning, coordination, and operations, especially for multi-jurisdictional and multi-
state operations.
A terrorist attack may require a response lasting days, and possibly weeks. Many local
entities have some capability for "shift changes" to allow personnel to rest and return to
work, but that capability is likely to be taxed quickly. As a result, we recommend more
intense tactical and operational planning to facilitate "second wave" capabilities
from outside entities after the depletion of local resources.
In our first report, we cited the multi-jurisdictional organizational structure that exists in
the Los Angeles metropolitan area, called the "LA Operational Area." More than 80
municipal and county jurisdictions participate in the LA Operational Area Terrorism
Working Group (TWG) and a related structure, the Terrorism Early Warning Group
(TEWG). Our support staff has conducted a case study of the LA Operational area to
provide "lessons learned."45 We recommend that States utilize one of the
standardized multi-state compacts, either the Emergency Management Assistance
Compact or the States Compact.46
41 In keeping with our earlier reasoning and recommendations, local jurisdictions are encouraged to
coordinate assistance from Federal agencies through the designated State agency.
42 See "States' Recommendations," No. 7, Appendix J.
43 See further discussions on training and exercise programs below.
44 See "States' Recommendations," Nos. 11 and 30, Appendix J.
45 That case study is included in Appendix G.
46 The Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) is an interstate mutual aid agreement that
provides a mechanism for States to assist each other in response to natural or man-made disasters. EMAC
is administered by the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA) and is recognized by the
25
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction
Improve Operational Command and Control of Domestic Responses
In response to an attack, lines of authority and responsibilities among the entities
involved must be clear. The responder community has made progress in establishing
command structures for response, but more is needed.
We recommend that the National Office for Combating Terrorism identify and
promote a standardized Incident Command System (ICS) model for tactical
operations for response to terrorist incidents that is part of an all-hazards approach.
The model should capture the best elements and "best practices" of the ICS already in
place in a number of jurisdictions but should always have two essential characteristics:
flexibility for adaptation to local circumstances and a configuration that includes State
and Federal liaison functions. As we noted in Chapter One, every local jurisdiction
(either individually or as part of a multi-jurisdictional agreement) should adopt a standard
ICS, and all levels of government above the local level should recognize that system.47
The terms "Incident Command System" and "Unified Command System" are often used
synonymously. We distinguish the two terms and recommend the identification and
promotion, by the National Office for Combating Terrorism, of a standardized
Unified Command System (UCS) model for operations and multi-agency, multi-
jurisdictional coordination above the tactical operations level. The UCS that we
envision would be required when Federal resources are involved in more than an
advisory or liaison capacity and when significant State assets are brought to bear.
When significant Federal resources are employed that involve two or more Federal
agencies, we recommend a single Federal Emergency Operations Center (EOC) be
established as part of the UCS.48 We recognize that certain Federal agencies will need
to conduct operations that cannot be open to all response entities. A standardized UCS
can be designed with flexibility for "compartmented" operations within the EOC to
protect classified or law enforcement sensitive information. The Federal EOC should
include the FBI, FEMA, and any other Federal agency that has a significant role,
geographically co-located to the extent feasible. Ideally, the State EOC should be located
in geographical proximity to the Federal EOC.
The ultimate goal for the implementation of ICS and UCS, and the co-location of EOCs,
is to delineate clear lines of authority for the conduct of operations at tactical and higher
levels and to provide maximum coordination. To enhance that process, we recommend
that each jurisdiction with an ICS and UCS develop operational templates to
Congress (Pub. L. 104312). According to NEMA, 34 states and Puerto Rico have adopted EMAC. The
"States Compact" refers to the Inters